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Lasting Light: Re-positioning the Legacy of the Enlightenment within Cultural 
Studies 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation concerns a re-evaluation of the ‘Enlightenment’ and its historiography 
within cultural theory in relation to contemporary debates concerning the limits and 
possibilities of active and inclusive citizenship, participatory democracy and a 
pluralistic public sphere. I interrogate what the eighteenth-century European 
Enlightenment encompasses and how this period and its legacy have been understood in 
relevant areas of philosophy and social theory. My contention is that an overly 
reductionist and negative understanding of the Enlightenment has come to dominate 
cultural theory over the past thirty years owing partly to a simplified reading of theorists 
including Foucault and Derrida. Using the work of, among others, Jürgen Habermas, I 
hope to demonstrate that a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of the 
Enlightenment and its legacy will aid contemporary social theory in formulating 
conceptions for a more just and equitable society. To this end, I show how 
contemporary figures within the Enlightenment, including Moses Mendelssohn, Mary 
Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges, are relevant to current theoretical concerns. I 
identify with Habermas’s argument in favour of an ‘enlightened critique of the 
Enlightenment’ and his assertion that modernity represents an ‘unfinished project’ 
rather than a static model of social superiority. At a time when religious 
fundamentalism and ideological extremism are dominant forces in global relations, and 
nationalism and cultural essentialism inform much of the public discourse on 
citizenship and democracy, a considered affirmation of the precepts of the 
Enlightenment is necessary to the realisation of socially progressive theory. 
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation aims to re-position the historical Enlightenment, and its legacy, within 
cultural theory, with a particular focus on the broad field of cultural studies. Such a re-
positioning is necessary because of the extent to which the historical Enlightenment and 
its legacy have been either misunderstood or misrepresented within cultural studies, as I 
will show. Within the field, the predominant view of the legacy of the Enlightenment is 
that, despite its emancipatory aims, it inaugurates an oppressive and exclusionary mode 
of modernity. I aim to show that not only is this view falsifiable, but also that many of 
the writings and protagonists of the historical Enlightenment can be of relevance to 
cultural studies in its theorisation of progressive social change and an inclusive public 
sphere.1 
 
 As I re-iterate here, it is not my intention to denigrate cultural studies as a multi-
disciplinary field or to position it as a ‘straw man’ against which a potentially 
reactionary defence of ‘western modernity’ and ‘Enlightenment values’ can be 
mounted. I write from within the field of cultural studies and not from outside it. I show 
how lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of ‘the Enlightenment’ is depriving the 
field of potentially useful resources in critical theory and practice. I hope to demonstrate 
how a more nuanced understanding of the complexity and diversity of the historical 
Enlightenment and its legacy will aid the political practice(s) of cultural studies. My 
argument is thus related to the broader question of historical awareness within the field. 
 
                                                
1 In using the term ‘progressive’ I follow Foucault’s definition that ‘progressive politics is a politics which defines, 
within a practice, possibilities for transformation and the play of dependencies between these transformations’. This 
is of particular relevance to the oppressed or marginalised social groups discussed in this dissertation. Foucault, cited 
in David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, London: Hutchinson, 1993, p. 195. 
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 In so far as it concerns the validation of the Enlightenment from a perspective 
that is socially and politically progressive, the subject of this dissertation may invite 
comparison with the work of Jürgen Habermas. The work of Habermas is pivotal to this 
dissertation and engagement with his theories feature strongly throughout, particularly 
in Chapters Two and Five. However, it is my intention to go further than simply 
agreeing with Habermas. His theories serve to position my argument concerning the 
continued relevance of the Enlightenment to a progressive mode of cultural studies and 
are not just ends in themselves. While Habermas positions Immanuel Kant as his 
exemplary Enlightenment figure, I demonstrate how this historical period remains 
relevant to the theorisation of social justice by focusing, in Part Two, on marginalised 
and subaltern subjects who actively engaged in the Enlightened ‘republic of letters’. The 
figures of Moses Mendelssohn, Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges serve to 
exemplify the progressive and self-critical impulse of the Enlightenment. 
 
 Before detailing the structure of this dissertation, I shall clarify the definition of 
the historical Enlightenment that I use. I cannot charge that ‘the Enlightenment’ is 
inadequately historicised within cultural studies and then not properly situate it. As I 
acknowledge repeatedly below, the Enlightenment was one of the first historical periods 
to name itself within its own happening, as Foucault has stated.2 I use the terms 
‘Enlightenment’ or ‘the Enlightenment’ (capital E) to refer specifically to a sustained 
period of varied social and intellectual development that occurred throughout eighteenth 
century Europe (and some of its colonies). However, there are thinkers from the 
seventeenth century, including John Locke, Christian Wolff and Samuel von Pufendorf, 
who figure here as ‘proto-Enlightenment’ figures. The historical Enlightenment is not a 
singular entity and some of the various ‘national’ enlightenments figure strongly in my 
writing. In terms of capitalisation and the use of the definite article, I have endeavoured 
                                                
2 Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007, p. 85. 
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to be consistent according to context. However, there is little consistency among the 
various writers referenced in this work. In some instances, this is due to the distinction 
between Enlightenment as historical period and enlightenment as intellectual concept. 
This is the distinction that I follow. The often problematic nature of definition and use 
results in the frequent use of quotation marks. I refer to ‘cultural studies’ without 
capitalisation because it is a field rather than a single discipline. 
 
 The structure of this dissertation consists of three parts sub-divided into five 
chapters. Part One, consisting of Chapters One and Two, is concerned with how the 
Enlightenment has been positioned, both within cultural studies specifically and more 
broadly within cultural theory. Part Two, consisting of Chapters Three and Four, serves 
to demonstrate the progressive actuality of the historical Enlightenment through the 
figures of Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges. Part Three, consisting of 
Chapter Five, is concerned with the continued relevance of Enlightenment thought to 
the theorisation of progressive social change and an inclusive public sphere. 
 
 In Chapter One, I begin by foregrounding the scholarly debate concerning the 
interlocking definitions of ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’ and the legacy of these 
concepts. I give a concise overview of the supposedly opposing arguments of 
Habermas, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida on these questions and indicate that 
there is more commonality between them than is often assumed. This leads into the 
main focus of the chapter: the dominant representation of the Enlightenment within 
cultural studies and how this is problematic. While acknowledging that practitioners 
such as Stuart Hall endorse ‘the Enlightenment project’, I detail numerous examples of 
how the Enlightenment is positioned within the field and identify re-occurring features. 
I demonstrate that the Enlightenment is predominantly presented, if at all, in a manner 
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that is poorly historicised and pejorative. I argue that it serves as a shorthand trope for 
oppressive modernity and that this is related to how power is theorised in cultural 
studies. Using the work of Mark Gibson, I probe how post-war European theory was 
adopted within the ‘Anglo-sphere’ of cultural studies. I contend that the dominant 
reading of Enlightenment in the field is in part due to simplification and 
misunderstanding regarding what theorists such as Foucault and Derrida have argued in 
relation to ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’. 
 
 In Chapter Two, I therefore return to Habermas and his debates with Foucault 
and Derrida concerning the character and legacy of ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’. I 
do this via an extended reading of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. I situate 
Habermas’s critiques of other theorists within the political and social context in which 
the book was written. I show that his arguments in relation to Foucault and Derrida have 
not remained static and that he came to an understanding with both thinkers 
respectively, such that they shared with him an ultimately affirmative view of 
‘Enlightenment’. In the case of Foucault and Habermas, I show how engagement with 
the work of Kant provided a shared point of reference in affirming the necessity of a 
self-critical model of modernity. 
 
 Chapter Three focuses on how the writings of Kant and Mendelssohn intersect 
in the context of the German Enlightenment and its process of self-definition. I show 
how Mendelssohn, as a contemporary and acquaintance of Kant, warrants at least equal 
recognition to the latter as a thinker who advocated an intrinsically moral conception of 
what enlightenment should be. I focus on how Mendelssohn used the discourses of the 
Enlightenment to argue for the extension of civil rights and religious freedom to the 
 5 
Jews of Prussia. I also argue that Mendelssohn’s conceptions of religious toleration and 
social pluralism are more radically progressive than those advanced by Kant. 
 
 In Chapter Four, I focus on how both Wollstonecraft and de Gouges, in differing 
ways, attempted to harness Enlightenment ideas of ‘Reason’ and ‘Virtue’ to a project of 
equal female citizenship and participation in the public sphere. Both women are 
positioned not only as ‘proto-feminist’ figures but also as advocates of a radical 
conception of democratic and egalitarian citizenship. 
 
 In Chapter Five, I build on what has been demonstrated up to this point. I focus 
on the continued relevance of Enlightenment thought to the theorisation of progressive 
social change and an inclusive public sphere. I return to the theory of Habermas and 
engage in an intertextual reading of how he and David Morley, a theorist working in 
cultural studies, approach the question of how to foster a democratic and inclusive (and 
trans-national) public sphere. I then examine Habermas’s developing ideas on the status 
of religious and cultural pluralism within the framework of a democratic and 
constitutional state. While Habermas looks to Kant as a theoretical precursor, I show 
that such ideas link back to the work of Mendelssohn. In the final section of the 
Chapter, I turn to Nancy Fraser’s (broadly sympathetic) critique of Habermas’s work 
and demonstrate how the work of Wollstonecraft and de Gouges remains relevant to the 
contemporary feminist theorisation of the public sphere. I thereby show that some of the 
ideas and protagonists of the historical Enlightenment are of continued relevance to the 
project of cultural studies. I re-iterate these arguments and suggest possible further 
developments in the Conclusion. 
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Part One 
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Chapter One 
The ‘Enlightenment’ and Cultural Studies 
 
‘What is Enlightenment?’ is a question that has been asked from the eighteenth century 
onwards. In historical terms, the Enlightenment is associated with Europe during the 
eighteenth century and with processes of change in social and intellectual development 
during this period. However, Enlightenment as a historical period and enlightenment as 
an intellectual formation are intrinsically difficult to categorise and identify. The 
significance and meaning of the epoch has been questioned, affirmed and contested 
from its own natality through to the conscious interrogation of ‘modernity’ that has 
been a prominent feature of cultural theory in the post-war period. The Enlightenment 
and its legacy remain contentious because of the ongoing theoretical debate over the 
ideas of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ and the potentially destructive patterns of social and 
environmental change that these ideas supposedly engender. Within the realm of 
‘progressive’ theory there understandably exists a longstanding ambivalence regarding 
the idea of ‘progress’. There is doubt over whether the legacy of Enlightenment thought 
is an impetus towards greater social justice and human perfectibility or greater 
oppression and environmental and social destruction. How the Enlightenment has been 
understood and positioned within contemporary cultural theory and in particular within 
the field of cultural studies is the subject of this chapter. 
 
 ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’ are linked, but it is potentially erroneous to 
conflate the two subjects. For example, in historicist discourse, the term ‘Early Modern’ 
may be used as a chronological marker to designate the European Renaissance, which 
occurred some four hundred to two hundred years before the period of the eighteenth 
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century Enlightenment. However, this Enlightenment embodies a self-conscious 
modernity. The relationship between the historical Enlightenment and the condition of 
modernity and progressive change was recognised, debated and problematised within its 
own time. While the self-awareness of the historical European Enlightenment is the 
primary focus of Part Two, the salient argument is that any meaningful effort to 
historicise tropes of ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’ has to involve engaging with the 
particularity of the historical Enlightenment and its legacy. This kind of engagement, 
critical but affirmative, has long been advocated and practised by the German critical 
theorist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas. What can be described as Habermas’s 
‘qualified defence’ of the ‘Enlightenment project’ is linked to a strongly argued belief in 
the crucial necessity of a paradigm of ‘modernity’ to any theoretical discourse or 
political programme that advocates progressive change. 
 
 This argument, put forward by Habermas primarily through a series of lectures 
in the early nineteen-eighties (and afterwards published as The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity) was formulated within the context of the popularisation of critiques of 
‘modernity’ advanced by theorists including Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. At 
the time, Habermas affirmed that theories of so-called ‘postmodernity’ are potentially 
conservative in undermining concepts of rationality and progressive change. In The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas’s central contention against the 
(differing) theoretical positions of Foucault and Derrida is that they constitute a ‘radical 
critique of reason [which] exacts a high price for taking leave of modernity’ and which 
demonstrates a ‘reckless disregard for its own foundations’.3 While many elements of 
modernity can and should be criticised, the possibility for just and progressive social 
change, for Habermas, is predicated on the values of the Enlightenment and any critique 
                                                
3 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, pp. 336-37. 
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must recognise this. As Thomas McCarthy, in his introduction to the English-language 
edition of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, states: 
Habermas agrees with the radical critics of enlightenment that the paradigm of 
consciousness is exhausted. Like them, he views reason as inescapably situated, 
as concretized in history, society, body, and language. Unlike them, however, he 
holds that the defects of the Enlightenment can only be made good by further 
enlightenment. The totalized critique of reason undercuts the capacity of reason 
to be critical.4 
 
However, such a positioning of the ‘radical critics’ has proved to be misleading. While 
Habermas’s critique of the theoretical positions of Foucault and Derrida occurs in the 
context of the early nineteen-eighties and is based on the reading of texts written during 
the nineteen-sixties and seventies, subsequent debate and engagement has led to 
clarification regarding these authors’ respective positions on the legacy and necessity of 
enlightened modernity, although such examples of clarification, dialogue and 
rapprochement appear to be largely unrecognised. Foucault states in an interview that he 
is ‘completely in agreement’ with Habermas regarding the necessity of a tradition of 
rational critique as represented by figures such as Kant.5 He affirms the need to 
critically examine the legacy of such rationality and what it entails. He states: 
I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the 
eighteenth century has always been … the question: what is this Reason that we 
use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers? 
How can we exist as rational beings, fortunately committed to practicing a 
rationality that is unfortunately crisscrossed by intrinsic dangers? One should 
remain as close to this question as possible, keeping in mind that it is both 
central and extremely difficult to resolve. In addition, if it is extremely 
dangerous to say that Reason is the enemy that must be eliminated, it is just as 
dangerous to say that any critical questioning of this rationality risks sending us 
into irrationality.6 
 
 Foucault is in fundamental agreement with Habermas concerning the need for a critique 
of the Enlightenment that itself stems from the enlightened tradition. The cultural and 
intellectual legacies of rationalist modernity should neither be rejected outright, nor 
                                                
4 ibid., p. xvii. 
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Space, Power, Knowledge’, an interview with Paul Rabinow reprinted in Simon During (ed.), 
The Cultural Studies Reader, London: Routledge, 1993, p. 165. 
6 ibid. 
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uncritically embraced. In this statement, Foucault expressly positions himself within the 
continuum of enlightened thought. As Habermas first stated in a public lecture given in 
Frankfurt during 1980, which would serve as the precursor to themes addressed in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, the condition of modernity should be understood 
to embody an ‘unfinished project’, rather than a static condition.7  
 
Derrida, the other ‘radical critic’ most extensively engaged with by Habermas, 
also affirms the necessity of what he terms the ‘spirit of the Enlightenment’. In his 1993 
address, Specters of Marx, he states that this spirit ‘must not be renounced’.8 In referring 
to his conception of the ‘new International’, he speaks of the possibility of a ‘new 
Enlightenment for the century to come’.9 Thus, Derrida concurs with Habermas in 
situating enlightened modernity as a necessarily ‘unfinished project’. In his 1980 
lecture, Habermas asks the rhetorical question ‘should we continue to hold fast to the 
intentions of the Enlightenment, however fractured they may be, or should we rather 
relinquish the entire project of modernity?’10 Both Foucault and Derrida answer in the 
affirmative to the former part of the question. A more detailed engagement with the 
works of Habermas, Foucault and Derrida, and the textual relationship between them, is 
featured in the following chapter. 
 
It is in the context of a perceived conflict between Habermas and the so-called 
‘post-modernists’ that Stuart Hall, a pre-eminent theorist in British cultural studies, 
outlined his position on questions concerning the theorising of cultural modernity in an 
interview conducted during the middle of the nineteen-eighties. Hall asserts that 
                                                
7 Habermas, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’, reprinted in Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib 
(eds), Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 38-55. 
8 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning and the New International, 
London: Routledge, 1994, p. 110. 
9 ibid., p. 113. 
10 Habermas, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’ in Passerin d’Entrèves and Benhabib, (eds), Habermas and the 
Unfinished Project of Modernity, pp. 45-46. 
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‘Habermas’s defence of the Enlightenment/modernist project is worthy and courageous’ 
but that it is ‘not sufficiently exposed to some of the deeply contradictory tendencies in 
modern culture to which the postmodernist theories quite correctly draw our attention’.11 
He goes on to argue that postmodernist theory, as exemplified in this case by Lyotard 
and Baudrillard, is also unsatisfactory, being too ‘celebratory’ of the conditions of late 
modernity.12 He asserts that there are therefore ‘two unacceptable choices: Habermas’s 
defensive position in relation to the old Enlightenment project and Lyotard’s Euro-
centred celebration of the postmodern collapse’.13 While Hall admits that such a 
statement represents an ‘oversimplified binary choice’, he nevertheless uses that 
binarised understanding in the interview.14 Leaving aside his treatment of Lyotard and 
Baudrillard, Hall’s endorsement of Habermas’s ‘worthy and courageous’ defence of the 
Enlightenment is not expanded on. 
 
As with Foucault and Derrida, Hall has affirmed the necessity of both 
acknowledging and valorising the ‘Enlightenment project’. However, the 
‘Enlightenment’ to which he refers remains a singular and ahistorical entity, not 
positioned within a wider context. The question of what is ‘Enlightenment’ is not 
addressed. Within cultural studies as a field, ‘Enlightenment’ is rarely interrogated in its 
own right. ‘Modernity’ is a concept that is perhaps even more amorphous and unstable 
in both its meaning and usage. Nor does it help the process of understanding that, for 
the sake of argument, the two concepts tend to be conflated, even by a theorist as 
otherwise careful and precise as Habermas. However, both Foucault and Derrida, and a 
leading theorist within British cultural studies, Stuart Hall, are in fundamental 
                                                
11 Stuart Hall, ‘On Postmodernism and Articulation: An Interview with Stuart Hall’, edited by Lawrence Grossberg, 
reprinted in David Morley and Kuan Hsing Chen (eds), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, London: 
Routledge, 1996, p. 131. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid., p. 132. 
14 ibid. 
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agreement with Habermas regarding the validity and necessity of an often vaguely 
defined ‘Enlightenment Project’. 
 
The fundamentally affirmative view of the ‘Enlightenment project’ held by Hall 
has not been the predominant position in contemporary cultural studies. Writing in 
Modernity and its Futures, published in 1992 and co-edited by Hall, Steven Yearley 
states that ‘an appreciation of Western societies’ environmental problems has 
encouraged social scientists to question in a new way the Enlightenment 
“achievements” of economic growth, technological progress and scientific advance’.15 
Writing on the subject of identity and biological reproduction in Questions of Cultural 
Identity, another book co-edited by Hall, Marilyn Strathern refers to ‘the notorious 
social contract as conceived by the Enlightenment’.16 The common feature of these two 
examples is not only that ‘Enlightenment’ is referred to with pejorative connotations but 
also that it is positioned in almost anthropomorphic terms as a singular entity and 
referred to only in passing. There is no attempt by the respective authors to explain what 
they are arguing the Enlightenment is in relation to philosophical and historical context. 
Rather than the ‘social contract’ being situated as an idea that developed within the 
historical context of the Enlightenment, which is itself an arguable proposition, it is 
written as if the Enlightenment is the direct author of this idea. ‘Enlightenment’ is being 
used as a shorthand description for the concept of a rationalist modernity that embodies 
oppressive power. This concept is often used to frame what contemporary cultural 
theory is reacting against. 
The story behind postmodernism, although it resists the narrative form, is about 
the end of another and greater story. The concluding tale is that which was 
written by the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment established a set of typical 
characters, with typical motives and a shared goal, that is to say that it provided 
                                                
15 Steven Yearley, ‘Environmental Challenges’ in Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (eds), Modernity and 
its Futures, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992, p. 118. 
16 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Enabling Identity? Biology, Choice and the New Reproductive Technologies’ in Stuart Hall 
and Paul du Gay (eds), Questions of Cultural Identity, London: Sage, 1996, p. 43. 
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the ‘grand’ narrative form for the history of modernity. Reason was to triumph 
over faith, humankind was to become the measure of all things, nature was to be 
quelled and put to the service of humankind, and time was to be measured in 
terms of a transition from darkness into the light, a transition and an implicit 
theory of moral evolution that came to be known as progress.17 
 
This quotation, taken from the second edition of Culture, a book written by Chris Jenks 
as part of the Routledge Key Ideas series, again demonstrates particular tendencies as to 
how the historical Enlightenment is positioned in cultural studies. This is the first 
reference to ‘the Enlightenment’ contained in the text. Jenks does present a summarised 
argument as to what Enlightenment is and yet there is no attempt to explain its historical 
or cultural context. Rather, the concept of ‘the Enlightenment’ serves to contrast 
‘modernity’ with ‘postmodernism’. Jenks goes on to state that: 
The centrality of humankind and, following Descartes, cognitive subjectivism, 
when linked to the institutionalised mode of reason that we call science, 
provided the methodology of this master plan. However, as history has shown 
us, the self-appointed claims of the methodology, those to objectivity, and the 
ideological insulation of its practitioners, in the form of value-neutrality, have 
created an accelerative moral vacuum. World wars, techniques and technologies 
of mass extermination and a market-led programme of subsequently polluting 
productivity have all weighed in the deficit column to offset the gains in health, 
income, enlightenment, democratisation and overall quality of life. Is this then 
the state of modernity that warrants the new designation – postmodernism?18 
 
 Again, ‘the Enlightenment’ is presented in almost anthropomorphic terms as a singular 
entity that has supposedly driven the development of all aspects of contemporary social, 
technological and economic organisation. Jenks goes some way toward rendering 
problematic the nature of ‘postmodernism’ but does not extend the same cautious 
ambivalence in regard to what constitutes ‘modernity’ and the complex connections 
between discourses of ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘modernity’. 
 
Within Jenks’s summary, the conflation of ‘the Enlightenment’ with ‘modernity’ 
and scientific methodology is compounded by a largely pessimistic view of the results 
of such ‘modernity’. Jenks, in the space of a paragraph, constructs a precise and linear 
                                                
17 Chris Jenks, Culture (Key Ideas) 2nd edn., London: Routledge, 2005, pp. 192-93 (italics original). 
18 ibid., p. 193. 
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narrative directly linking the ‘progress’ of ‘the Enlightenment’ to a ‘deficit column’ 
containing ‘world wars’ and ‘technologies of mass extermination’ in a way that 
resembles a simplified and condensed version of the argument advanced by Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment, a book which is 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter of this dissertation. Neither 
Horkheimer, Adorno nor their text is referred to in this section of Jenks’s book, 
although there is mention of them in relation to the concept of the ‘culture industry’ in 
an earlier chapter.19 It should also be noted that the paragraphs quoted above represent 
the sum total of any reference to ‘the Enlightenment’ in Culture, a text that is supposed 
to serve as an introduction to, and general overview of, the concept in relation to how it 
is approached in the social sciences and humanities. The way in which Jenks conceives 
of ‘the Enlightenment’ and the legacy of ‘modernity’, which comes ironically close to 
constituting a metanarrative about the rise of ‘postmodernism’, may partly stem from 
the difficulty involved in making theoretical distinctions concerning the differing and 
contradictory aspects of ‘modernity’.  
 
Cultural theorists who follow the same basic line of argument as Horkheimer 
and Adorno in suggesting a correlation between the precepts of the Enlightenment and 
the social or technological rationality used in the operation of, for example, 
concentration camps, are limited by difficulties in adequately outlining the theoretical 
and historical distinction between philosophical and ideological modernity and 
scientific and technological modernity. As Habermas has recognised, societies can 
actively pursue technological and economic development while explicitly rejecting 
aspects of ‘modernity’.20 A consequence of this conflation is that problematic or 
negative features of ‘modernity’, including contemporary life in industrialised western 
                                                
19 ibid., p. 109. 
20 Habermas, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’ in Passerin d’Entrèves and Benhabib (eds), Habermas and the 
Unfinished Project of Modernity, pp. 42-44. 
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societies, are situated as being the direct results of the ‘Enlightenment’. To assert that 
elements of modernity such as corporate capitalism, the formation of the nation-state, 
and scientific rationalism are directly descended from ‘Enlightenment’ concepts is to 
confuse the many historical, social and structural catalysts of ‘modernity’ with a largely 
critical and pre-dominantly intellectual social and cultural movement that occurred in 
Europe and North America during the eighteenth century. 
 
If the positioning of ‘the Enlightenment’ offered by Jenks is ahistorical, one 
author of a general or introductory text on cultural studies from within the field who 
attempts to both situate the period historically and explain its wider cultural and 
philosophical legacy is Fred Inglis. While the combined total of words on the subject 
contained in the book Cultural Studies comprises less than a page, it constitutes a 
sharply drawn picture. 
The Enlightenment coincided pretty well with Romanticism at the end of the 
eighteenth century. It taught the bad faith inherent in obedience to the old 
regimes, the power of reason to command human progress, the liberal duty to 
pull up the roots of blind tradition and superstitious custom. At its side, the great 
Romantics taught parallel lessons about the individual’s natural rights, the 
irresistible beauty of personal feeling, the self-made conceptions of morality. 
Together the two great movements inspired men and women to march beneath 
the banner of revolution and its triple Parisian cry, ‘liberty, equality, 
fraternity’.21 
 
Inglis evidently has a positive perspective on the ‘Enlightenment’ and its legacy, 
affirming its fundamentally socially and politically progressive aspects. He also 
attempts to explain what it actually is and to situate it within a historical and social 
context. However, from the perspective of a cultural historian, his mapping of the 
historical and social context of the ‘Enlightenment’ is flawed and inconsistent. The 
ways in which Romanticism was a reaction against, and in some respects the antithesis 
of, mainstream eighteenth century progressive thought is not elucidated in Inglis’s 
narrative. He does, however, attempt to bring together various different philosophical, 
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cultural and geographic strands of the broad European Enlightenment in forming his 
overview. 
A word on the Enlightenment, now so fiercely contested, misunderstood and 
calumniated an epoch. Let us place it between 1770 and 1800 (or so). It denotes 
that terrific surge of ideas which blew apart the ancien régime in France, 
initiated revolution there and in North America, and launched the classical 
doctrines of radical liberalism, as given their abrupt synopsis in the first chapter. 
These taught, by way of the great French subscription volume, the 
Encyclopaedia, by way of the German philosophers and the playwrights of 
Sturm und Drang, and by way of the English radicals, of Godwin, Bentham and 
Paine, that tradition was mere blind habit and that by the judicious application of 
reason, factual observation and scientific planning progress could be ensured 
and emancipation achieved by all humankind. The dynamism of this new surge 
in human possibility would be given by rational economic organization as 
codified by Smith and Ricardo, first masters of the new science of economics.22 
 
Inglis situates the Enlightenment within its European historical context, although in a 
manner which is overly broad and imprecise. His writing also suggests that the various 
protagonists of the French, Prussian and British ‘enlightenments’ were all involved in a 
conscious and co-ordinated plan, inadvertently echoing contemporary conservative 
polemics. The ‘euro-centrism’ of discourse about the ‘Enlightenment’ has long been 
problematised within cultural studies. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak refers to the 
‘Christian Enlightenment’.23 The use of such a phrase is itself problematic. While it is 
most probably used to mark the Enlightenment as a specifically European historical 
experience, and perhaps to differentiate such a European experience from periods of 
‘enlightenment’ in other contexts, ‘Christian’ is a strange and arguably inaccurate prefix 
to attach to the ‘Enlightenment’ as an intellectual movement. Given that opposition to 
the Church as an institution, together with an antipathy toward superstition and 
irrational belief, is foremost among the defining features of the European 
Enlightenment, it would seem inappropriate to situate it as being ‘Christian’. 
Nonetheless, philosophers of the Enlightenment who were not Christian faced acute 
prejudice, as I show in Chapter Three. 
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 It is pivotal to re-iterate that it is not my intention to denigrate cultural studies as 
a multi-disciplinary field or to position it as a ‘straw man’ against which a potentially 
reactionary defence of ‘western modernity’ and ‘Enlightenment values’ can be 
mounted. This dissertation is written from within the field of cultural studies and not 
from outside it. Rather, it is a case of returning to the question by Foucault quoted 
above, ‘What is this Reason that we use?’, and recognising the need to more fully 
engage with the question of what the ‘Enlightenment’ (or ‘enlightenments’) is (or are) 
in terms of historical context and philosophical diversity before affirming, positively or 
negatively, its contemporary legacy and progressive potential. The question of ‘legacy’ 
is a complex one. Within cultural studies, the dominant view of ‘Enlightenment’ is of a 
re-inscription and embodiment of power, rather than of a challenge to power. 
 
 Theorists and practitioners within cultural studies position the question of 
identity and the human subject as being a key area of difference between 
‘Enlightenment’ and ‘post-modern’ discourse. Despite his basically affirmative 
conception of what ‘the Enlightenment’ is, Hall asserts that the concept of identity that 
originated in this period is limiting and highly normative. 
The Enlightenment subject was based on a conception of the human person as a 
fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, 
consciousness, and action, whose ‘centre’ consisted of an inner core which first 
emerged when the subject was born…. I shall now look in somewhat more depth 
at how the concept of identity is said to have shifted, from that of the 
Enlightenment subject to that of the sociological and then the ‘post-modern’ 
subject.24 
 
‘Enlightenment’ is again positioned as a binary opposite to the ‘post-modern’, so that 
the contemporary theoretical concept of personal identity as fractured and fluid can be 
contrasted against a nominal hyper-rationalist and essentialist idea of subjectivity. This 
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argument is again predicated on the notion that the ‘Enlightenment’ is singular and 
monolithic, and that therefore the ideas about identity developed during this period are 
uniform.25 It can be expressly asserted that writers and philosophers as diverse as 
Locke, Hume, Rousseau and Wollstonecraft do not all advance the same conceptions of 
human identity. The Lockean concept of the young or unformed mind as a tabula rasa 
contradicts Hall’s above assertion that the ‘Enlightenment’ idea of personal identity is 
based on the belief in an ‘inner core which first emerged when the subject was born’. It 
is true that some of the ideas regarding human identity advanced during this period 
resemble Hall’s description. However, the re-occurring trope within cultural studies of a 
singular and philosophically unified ‘Enlightenment’ that embodies an oppressive 
modernity is indicative of a wider debate within the field about how theory is 
historicised and power is theorised. 
 
 In Culture and Power, published in 2007, Mark Gibson examines how and why 
the concept of ‘power’ has been used in the field over the course of its historical and 
international development. While not directly addressing the subject of the 
Enlightenment, Gibson’s book is useful in helping to form an understanding of why this 
subject has been positioned a certain way within cultural studies. He charts how the 
theorisation of power within cultural studies has developed from the avowedly non-
Marxist British empiricism of Richard Hoggart and, to a lesser extent, Raymond 
Williams through to the conscious embrace of (neo) Marxist theory and continental 
European philosophy firstly by Perry Anderson and E.P. Thompson and then to a much 
greater extent by Stuart Hall when he was director of the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural Studies at Birmingham during the 1970s, leading to an eventual situation 
where simplified understandings of the theoretical models developed by Hall and others 
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have established the basis for cultural studies as it is practised in the ‘Anglo-sphere’ 
including the United States. 
 
 Gibson outlines how any discussion in cultural studies concerning the 
theorisation of power and the use of European theory has to recognise what Paul Gilroy 
termed the ‘ethno-historical specificity’ of the field.26 Through its seminal connection to 
Britain, cultural studies has been adopted as an academic field of study in ‘the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand’ while ‘much of its theory has been 
borrowed from continental Europe’.27 Gibson demonstrates that it was Anderson and 
Thompson who argued for a turn toward continental theory in British cultural studies 
during the 1960s and 1970s because they were critical of the lack of a radical and 
totalising critique of society within British philosophical traditions.28 Part of Anderson’s 
Marxist analysis of British society was that, because the English Civil War was ‘pre-
Enlightenment’, it was not a liberal revolution and therefore had not altered the semi-
feudal structure of British society.29 Thompson contrasted this with the French 
Revolution and the supposed French philosophical paradigm of ‘clarity of 
confrontation, systematic critique, organised and intellectually directed forms of 
political action’.30 Gibson notes the irony of the situation in that Anderson and 
Thompson were advocating the use of totalizing continental theory over piecemeal 
British empiricism during the same period that French intellectuals, including Foucault, 
were questioning philosophical models that aspired to be systematic or totalising.31 
However, it was the conscious turn to (initially neo-Marxist) continental theory in 
British cultural studies that would lead to eventual engagement with Foucault. 
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 Gibson re-affirms the central importance of the Centre for Contemporary 
Cultural studies in Birmingham and the theoretical and political direction it took in the 
1970s in establishing the parameters of cultural studies as it has generally been practised 
since. It is viewed as the time and the place where the empiricist and liberal humanist 
tradition in cultural studies as embodied by Hoggart and Williams was fundamentally 
discontinued. As Gibson notes, ‘contemporary accounts of the development of the field 
abound in references to “interruptions”, “departures” and “ruptures”’.32 He goes on to 
state that: 
These are defined in two ways: at a theoretical level, in terms of the new 
possibilities opened up by the uptake of Marxism, Structuralism and European 
philosophy; and at the political level in terms of the upheavals of the late 1960s 
and the possibilities opened up by student activism, feminism and the ‘new 
social movements’.33 
 
While Gibson questions the extent to which developments at Birmingham during the 
1970s did constitute a ‘rupture’ within cultural studies, he concedes that efforts by 
Hoggart and Williams to ‘resist a generalised concept of power’ were largely 
unsuccessful as the themes of ‘power’ and power relations became central to the field.34 
This has, it is argued, led to certain dynamics in the use of tropes of oppression and 
resistance. 
 
Referring to the internal struggles over the introduction of feminist praxis at 
Birmingham during the 1970s, Gibson shows how ‘power’ began to be theorised via a 
certain narrative framework that would become standard within cultural studies. 
Feminism, black cultural studies, and later postcolonial criticism, are made to 
appear as having ‘revealed’ or ‘brought to light’ timeless phenomena which had 
previously been invisible or concealed. While this narrative was clearly 
important in providing fresh inspiration to cultural studies from the late 1970s 
through the 1980s, it has also contributed to a radical de-historicization of the 
concept of power. Particularly in the more theoretical discourses which 
developed or consolidated in the field during the 1980s, the concept is presumed 
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to refer transparently to a universal or quasi-universal phenomenon, specified at 
most with reference to ‘patriarchy’, ‘modernity’, or the historical mission of ‘the 
West’. This de-historicization makes it impossible to consider problems in 
relation to the specific circumstances in which they arose. While increasingly 
elaborate theories of power have emerged, little attention has been paid to the 
way the concept has been formed by the social, political and cultural contexts of 
the 1970s.35 
 
This analysis concerning the ‘radical de-historicization of power’ provides a key to 
understanding the predominant theoretical positioning of the Enlightenment within 
cultural studies. An often insufficiently historicised Enlightenment serves as a proxy 
for, or is conflated with, a ‘modernity’ that embodies ‘Western’ oppression. This pattern 
is compounded by the use of certain kinds of continental European theory. Many of the 
mobilised criticisms of ‘Enlightenment’ are based on simplified or reductionist 
understandings of what theorists such as Foucault are presumed to have argued in 
relation to ‘reason’ and ‘the Classical age’. The irony is that some of the foundational 
practitioners of cultural studies were engaging with the legacy of the Enlightenment 
outside of the turn to continental theory, as evidenced by Raymond Williams writing on 
the works of David Hume.36 The question of what Foucault and other European 
philosophers actually argue in relation to the Enlightenment is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Situating The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and its Contexts 
 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne) 
remains the definitive statement by Jürgen Habermas regarding the necessity of the 
‘Enlightenment project’ for progressive social change. It functions as a polemic, albeit 
as one that is generally nuanced and sensitive. As such, it should be understood in 
relation to the historical context in which it was written. Referring to Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment and its wartime genesis, Habermas states that 
‘explanations in terms of contemporary history and psychology can be of interest in 
theoretical contexts only to the extent that they provide hints of a systematic motive’.37 
Accordingly, explanation of the motive underpinning Habermas and The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity cannot be separated from the political and social contexts of the 
nineteen-eighties. Nor can an explanation be developed without a linked understanding 
of Habermas’s theoretical and political orientation. His conception of a just and 
radically democratic society cannot be separated from the emphasis in his theory on 
communicative rationality. 
 
The belief in the need for such a form of rationality drives Habermas’s argument 
concerning the importance and necessity of a type of self-aware intellectual modernity 
derived from the Enlightenment. Aspects of modernity, including the negative effects of 
technological and administrative rationality, should be criticised but such criticism must 
be rational if it is to remain progressive in its intent. In the introduction to Habermas 
and the Unfinished Project of Modernity, an edited collection that serves as a response 
to Discourse of Modernity, Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves affirms the link between the 
arguments Habermas advances in this work and the focus of his broader theory. 
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He is deeply aware of the distortions, aporias and pathologies of modernity, but 
believes that they can only be addressed and resolved in a fruitful way by 
protecting and expanding the sphere of communicative rationality against the 
systematic imperatives of the economy and the state (that is, reversing the 
colonization of the lifeworld), and by relinking the differentiated domains of 
science, morality and art, and their corresponding expert cultures, with the 
communicative praxis of the lifeworld…. By confronting modernity on its own 
terms, rather than escaping into a nostalgia for premodern traditions, or 
enthusiastically embracing a technocratic vision of postmodernity, or invoking 
an antimodern conception of the ‘other’ of reason, Habermas can thereby hope 
to redeem the unfulfilled promises of modernity.38 
 
It is useful therefore to position The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity by 
establishing what it is not. It is not a liberal-rationalist defence of an unproblematic 
modernity. It is expressly not a conservative critique. Nor is it a Marxist critique against 
‘postmodernism’ as exemplified by the writings of Alex Callenicos. It is instead a work 
based in the tradition of critical theory derived from the Frankfurt School. However, it 
is not my intention to re-inscribe the idea that The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity is best understood as part of the querelle between Frankfurt School ‘neo-
Marxists’ on one side and French ‘post-modernists’ on the other.  
 
The tendency within English-speaking analysis to view Discourse of Modernity 
predominantly in terms of a conflict that positions Habermas against both Foucault and 
Derrida is a damaging simplification. The oppositional character of the criticisms 
Habermas advanced against both theorists has been over-emphasised, often at the 
expense of properly acknowledging the ultimately constructive engagement that was 
engendered. In regard to Foucault, as I will demonstrate, such a process of engagement 
had already reached its conclusion by the time The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity had been published in 1985. Another consequence of situating the work 
primarily in terms of the Habermas-Foucault-Derrida nexus is that equally crucial 
protagonists and arguments are not always sufficiently engaged with. Of the ten essays 
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that comprise Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity, most of which 
directly correspond with the twelve lectures contained in Discourse of Modernity, there 
are two on Derrida by different authors, one on Foucault, and five that deal with broader 
questions of ‘post-modernist’ and ‘post-structuralist’ theory. Engagement with 
Habermas’s views concerning the intellectual legacies of Hegel, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger is condensed into a single essay and his analysis of Horkheimer and Adorno 
and their Dialectic of Enlightenment is not given a specific chapter.  
 
It is fair to state that Habermas’s analysis of both Nietzsche and Heidegger in 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity is bound up with his critique of 
‘postmodernity’ and his readings of Foucault and Derrida respectively. In this chapter, I 
also confine my engagement with Nietzsche and Heidegger to its bearing on 
Habermas’s argument and his linking of them to other theorists. I begin my analysis of 
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity by focusing on Habermas’s reading of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. I then explore the philosophical 
and political motivations behind Habermas’s reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger. This 
leads to an analysis of Habemas’s reading of Derrida in relation to the latter’s later and 
more politically affirmative work. I conclude with an analysis of Habermas’s reading of 
Foucault and a demonstration of the pivotal philosophical rapprochement between them 
as embodied by their mutual engagement with Kant’s writings on Enlightenment. I hope 
to show that The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity should be understood within the 
political and cultural context in which it was written as a progressive affirmation of 
‘Enlightenment’ and that Habermas’s engagement with some of its featured 
protagonists has not been static. 
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Horkheimer and Adorno and Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Habermas refers to Dialectic of Enlightenment as the ‘blackest book’ to be written by 
Horkheimer and Adorno.39 By this he means that it is their most pessimistic work as it 
explicitly argues that the self-consciously progressive modernity embodied by the 
Enlightenment has failed. The opening statement of the book’s main chapter 
encapsulates their argument. 
In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always 
aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the 
fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant. The program of the 
Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths 
and the substitution of knowledge for fancy.40 
 
The argument that the legacy of the Enlightenment is a negative and destructive form of 
rationalism runs throughout the book. However, in the original 1944 introduction, both 
Adorno and Horkheimer affirm that ‘social freedom is inseparable from enlightened 
thought’.41 Yet it is then stated that this mode of thought nevertheless contains the 
‘seed’ of the ‘reversal’ of civilization currently being experienced (within the context of 
the Second World War).42 Habermas recognises that the book’s pessimistic outlook is 
informed both by historical context and the intellectual grounding of the Frankfurt 
School. 
Critical Theory was initially developed in Horkheimer’s circle to think through 
political disappointments at the absence of revolution in the West, the 
development of Stalinism in Soviet Russia, and the victory of fascism in 
Germany. It was supposed to explain mistaken Marxist prognoses, but without 
breaking with Marxist intentions. Against this background it becomes 
intelligible how the impression could indeed get established in the darkest years 
of the Second World War that the last sparks of reason were being extinguished 
from this reality and had left the ruins of a civilization in collapse without any 
hope.43  
 
Habermas writes as someone whose own intellectual development is strongly 
influenced by the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory and who worked with 
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Adorno and Horkheimer following the post-war re-establishment of the Institute for 
Social Research (Institut fur Socialforschung or IfS) in the nineteen-fifties.44 He would 
leave the IfS at the end of the decade, supposedly dissatisfied with Horkheimer’s 
apparent attitude of increasingly conservative resignation.45 Horkheimer’s anti-Nazi and 
anti-Stalinist political stance, coupled with his gratitude at the US-led liberation of 
Germany, meant that the reconstituted IfS abandoned its earlier Marxist and radical 
theoretical orientation in favour of one that was limited to the advancement of liberal-
democratic consolidation within the Federal Republic.46 Horkheimer’s experiences 
resulted in him developing a highly pessimistic theoretical attitude concerning both the 
feasibility and desirability of radical social change. 
 
 In arguing against what he sees as the pessimism and nihilism of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Habermas focuses on Horkheimer and Adorno’s use of Nietzsche. In a 
section of the book titled ‘Excursus: Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment’, 
Horkheimer and Adorno situate Nietzsche, together with the German Romantics, as 
recognising the contradictions of an Enlightenment that resists ‘domination’ while also 
masking power and manipulation.47 They state: 
Nietzsche was one of the few after Hegel who recognised the dialectic of 
enlightenment…. [T]he revelation of these two aspects of the Enlightenment as 
an historic principle made it possible to trace the notion of enlightenment as 
progressive thought, back to the beginning of traditional history. Nevertheless, 
Nietzsche’s relation to the Enlightenment … was still discordant. Though he 
discerned both the universal movement of sovereign Spirit (whose executor he 
felt himself to be) and a ‘nihilistic’ anti-life force is the enlightenment, his pre-
Fascist followers retained only the second aspect and perverted it into an 
ideology. This ideology becomes blind praise of a blind life subject to the same 
nexus of action by which everything living is suppressed.48 
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It would appear that Horkheimer and Adorno are ultimately critical of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, particularly in relation to how it was misappropriated by proto-Fascist or 
Nazi ideology. However, Habermas criticises their ‘ambivalent attitude towards 
Nietzsche’ and links what he perceives as their anti-rationalism to the influence of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy.49 He argues that it is this influence that leads Horkheimer and 
Adorno to give insufficient credit to the ‘achievements of Occidental rationalism’.50 He 
asks the question: 
How can these two men of the Enlightenment (which they both remain) be so 
unappreciative of the rational content of cultural modernity that all they perceive 
everywhere is a binding of reason and domination, of power and validity? Have 
they also let themselves be inspired by Nietzsche in drawing their criteria for 
cultural criticism from a basic experience of aesthetic modernity that has now 
been rendered independent?51 
 
He further asks ‘did the state of the question by which Horkheimer and Adorno saw 
themselves confronted at the beginning of the 1940s leave no way out?’52 Habermas 
again situates the pessimism and supposed nihilism of Dialectic of Enlightenment 
within the context of the Second World War. In linking the negative dialectics of 
Horkheimer and Adorno to the philosophy of Nietzsche, he is drawing a negative 
association between tendencies he disapproves of in cultural theory and German 
Romanticism. This is one of the re-occurring tropes of The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. 
 
Heidegger and Derrida 
Given that Habermas’s writings are noted for caution and ambivalence, the polemical 
tone of The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity can be considered uncharacteristic, 
as the author of a philosophical-political profile, Martin Beck Matustik, contends.53 
Matustik argues that Habermas’s readings of both Foucault and Derrida are prone to 
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inaccuracy and generalisations, driven by his fear of where critiques of rationalism can 
lead.54 As I demonstrate, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity does not represent 
the last word in Habermas’s engagement with Foucault and Derrida. Its polemical tone 
and content should be understood within the context of the time in which it was 
conceived and in relation to Habermas’s own philosophical development. 
 
 During the nineteen-eighties Habermas was concerned about what he perceived 
as the increasing strength of politically and culturally conservative tendencies 
throughout the world. Such developments as the election of radically conservative 
governments in Britain, the United States and West Germany, the emergence of right-
wing historical revisionism also in West Germany, the crisis of the welfare state, and 
the increasing influence of ‘post-structuralist’ and ‘post-modernist’ theory in the 
Western academic milieu were all viewed by Habermas as an inter-connected assault on 
the concept of a progressive modernity and the legacy of the Enlightenment.55 He did 
not argue that Foucault and Derrida were themselves ‘neoconservative’ in their political 
orientation but rather that there was a danger that they were ‘cloaking their complicity 
with the venerable tradition of counter-Enlightenment in the garb of post-
Enlightenment’.56 In this context, Habermas would view Foucault’s use of Nietzsche 
and Derrida’s use of Heidegger with suspicion. 
 
 The largely negative attitude held by Habermas towards Heidegger stems from 
the former’s sense of disillusionment and anger as someone who was a young admirer 
of the latter’s thought. Habermas asserts that while debate and condemnation 
concerning Heidegger’s political orientation ‘must not be allowed to cloud our view of 
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the substantial content of his philosophical work’ neither should the question of the 
relationship between his ideological worldview and his philosophy be ignored.57 As a 
young university student in the early nineteen-fifties, Habermas identified as a follower 
of Heidegger’s philosophy as exemplified by Being and Time. The break with 
Heidegger was triggered by the publication in 1953 of his lectures on the Introduction 
to Metaphysics from 1935. Habermas recounts his response. 
I was, as a student, at that time so impressed with Being and Time that reading 
these lectures, fascist right down to their stylistic details, actually shocked me. I 
discussed this impression in a newspaper article – mentioning especially the 
sentence about the ‘inner truth and greatness of the Nazi movement’. What 
shocked me most was that Heidegger had published in 1953, without 
explanation or comment, what I had to assume was an unchanged lecture from 
1935. Even the foreword made no reference to what had happened in between.58 
 
What is at issue for Habermas is not just what Heidegger did or did not do in the 
nineteen-thirties but his failure to account for it. It is a matter of bad faith and historical 
denial. For Habermas there is a connection between Heidegger’s refusal to publicly 
reflect or admit error and his ‘self-understanding as a thinker with a privileged access to 
truth’.59 Heidegger’s view of the role of the intellectual is, according to Habermas, 
inherently anti-democratic and anti-rationalist. Habermas ultimately sees an intricate 
connection between Heidegger’s philosophy and his political ideology. 
 
 In both The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity and The New Conservatism 
Habermas often does not separate his critique of Derrida from his critique of Heidegger. 
He stresses Derrida’s identification as a ‘disciple’ of Heidegger.60 He asserts that 
‘Derrida concludes from Heidegger’s critique of modern subjectivity that we can escape 
from the treadmill of Western logocentrism only through aimless provocation’.61 
However, these sometimes florid assessments on the part of Habermas should be 
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understood in the political context of the nineteen-eighties and his belief in the necessity 
of rationalist modernity. 
 
Habermas and Derrida 
During the following decade Habermas and Derrida would come to a rapprochement. In 
1993 Specters of Marx was published. It embodies Derrida’s explicit affirmation of ‘a 
spirit of the Enlightenment’.62 This work, and the lectures upon which it is based, can be 
considered a reply to the characterisation of Derrida’s ‘deconstructionist’ theories as 
being antithetical to the advancement of progressive social change, and in particular to 
the assessment provided by Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
While Foucault may indeed have been the initial ‘preferred partner’ for Habermas in 
this project, as I refer to further on in this chapter, it was Derrida with whom he would 
develop a friendship during the nineteen-nineties. They would eventually collaborate in 
producing a text that stands as both a practical political intervention and as an 
expression of the spirit of the enlightenment that both theorists, through differing routes, 
affirm. The 2003 declaration, entitled ‘February 15, or, What binds Europeans 
Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, beginning in Core Europe’ was co-signed 
by Habermas and Derrida as a statement against the US invasion of Iraq and in support 
of a more unified Europe.63 It represents the fundamental political agreement between 
Habermas and Derrida. 
 
The understanding that both Habermas and Derrida affirm the necessity of a 
self-critical modernity, albeit from differing perspectives, is what underpins Giovanna 
Borradori’s work containing interviews with both men regarding their views on the 
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ramifications of the events that occurred in New York City on the eleventh of 
September 2001. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida is predicated on the thesis that the philosophical discussion of the 
events of ‘9/11’ and their aftermath should include ‘a critical reassessment of the 
political ideals of the Enlightenment’.64 Both theorists are positioned together in the 
context of this work as sharing a basic ‘allegiance to the Enlightenment’ in their 
differing approaches.65 The separate interviews that Borradori conducts with both men 
constitutes a dialogue with, rather than a dialogue between, them. However, in a broader 
sense Philosophy in a Time of Terror attempts to embody the rapprochement between 
Habermas and Derrida. There is a foregrounding of the underlying radical democratic 
politics that informs the differing theoretical projects of both men. This does not mean 
that Borradori argues that both Habermas and Derrida simply agree with each other. 
Rather, it means that she rejects the binarised and oppositional positioning of the two 
theorists that occurred within the intellectual context of the nineteen-eighties. She 
states: 
Where a philosopher stands vis-à-vis the heritage of the Enlightenment is thus 
not only a theoretical matter but also implies delicate political ramifications. 
Like many philosophers who came of age in the 1980s, I grew up convinced that 
Habermas and Derrida expressed sharply opposed views with regard to the 
Enlightenment: Habermas defended it, and Derrida rejected it. Later on, I came 
to realise that this was a skewed picture for which the intellectual obsession of 
the decade – the querelle between modernism and postmodernism – is the main 
culprit.66 
 
Philosophy in a Time of Terror has significance as being one of the first (and in 
retrospect, one of the last) works to facilitate an engagement between Habermas and 
Derrida based on the understanding that both offer readings of the Enlightenment that, 
while divergent, are ultimately complimentary. While Borradori does not render 
problematic the capitalized designation of ‘Enlightenment’ that she employs, she is 
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sensitive to the ambiguities of determining its legacy. She situates Habermas and 
Derrida as being oriented towards differing continuums in the European context: the 
former is positioned within a tradition of consciously progressive or emancipatory 
critical theory that has its lineage not only in the Frankfurt School but also in the work 
of Kant while the latter is linked to Nietzsche and Heidegger.67 This respective 
positioning of both Habermas and Derrida is in itself conventional and follows the 
understanding that Habermas himself constructs in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. However, these separate trajectories are positioned not as being 
incompatible, but as both embodying the self-critical evaluation that is pivotal to the 
project of Enlightenment. 
 
That this dialogue with Habermas and Derrida links the ongoing theoretical 
discussion of the ‘Enlightenment project’ with a discussion of the events relating to 
‘9/11’ is partly a result of timing. Both men were due to arrive at conferences in New 
York when the events occurred.68 It is, however, an event that brings some of the key 
theoretical tropes of both theorists into sharp focus. For Habermas, the events are 
relevant to his varied work on the nature of democracy, law, and terrorism. For both 
Habermas and Derrida, the questions of cosmopolitanism and how ‘Europe’ or ‘the 
West’ is constituted are also relevant. Within the framework of the book and its 
interviews, the events of September the eleventh constitute a threat to the social and 
political ideals of ‘Enlightenment’ both in relation to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and 
‘terrorism’ and in relation to the political and military responses that are engendered.  
 
Given that Borradori explicitly positions Habermas and Derrida as sharing a 
qualified belief in ‘Enlightenment’ ideals, it is unfortunate that Philosophy in a Time of 
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Terror does not contain a joint interview between them. The structure of the book, with 
Borradori’s separate interviews with both men featured between her commentary and 
analysis, leads to a sense that a rapprochement is being claimed but not necessarily 
demonstrated. As an intervention in the aforementioned querelle, the work does not 
match up with its stated intentions. Linking the respective reflections of Habermas and 
Derrida on ‘September the 11th’ with the broader question concerning ‘the legacy of the 
Enlightenment’ is a logical and worthwhile project. However, this synthesis is not 
readily apparent in the interviews and thus there is a sense of disconnection between 
Borradori’s stated project and the actual words of Habermas and Derrida. Just as 
Specters of Marx makes Derrida’s politics explicit through his reflections on the 
possibilities of progressive theory in the aftermath of the ‘Cold War’, Philosophy in a 
Time of Terror attempts to give Derrida a platform for political expression in the 
context of a recent event. However, as a demonstration of a convergence between 
Habermas and Derrida regarding the Enlightenment project, the work is less than 
successful in its stated intentions. 
 
 Philosophy in a Time of Terror is indicative of the increasing recognition among 
certain theorists of the need for revision regarding the perceived politics of the 
‘postmodern’. Following Derrida’s explicit identification with Enlightenment in 
Specters of Marx, there is a desire to progress from the understandings that have been 
dominant since the nineteen-eighties. Within this context, a rapprochement between 
Habermas and Derrida has significant symbolic value. Such a rapprochement had more 
time to develop than that between Habermas and Foucault. Nonetheless, while the 
developing philosophical recognition of shared understanding and agreement between 
Habermas and Derrida was genuine, Borradori’s intervention represents a forced 
attempt to incorporate this trope into a work that is expressly a philosophical meditation 
 34 
on the meaning of ‘9/11’. The ‘February 15’ declaration against the invasion of Iraq 
signed by both men two years later stands as a better example. However, the actual text 
was written solely by Habermas, albeit with Derrida’s endorsement. It seems fitting that 
the political and philosophical convergence between Habermas and Derrida was marked 
by aporias and silences. 
 
Foucault and Habermas on Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung? 
Michel Foucault is the subject of two lectures in The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. Thomas McCarthy, in his introduction to the English-language edition, 
concludes that it would appear Foucault is the ‘preferred partner’ for Habermas ‘in his 
dialogue with French poststructuralism’.69 McCarthy’s use of the word ‘dialogue’ is 
instructive. Some commentators have interpreted Discourse of Modernity as 
constituting a series of polemic ‘attacks’ on theorists including Foucault and Derrida.70 I 
have explored the context for this and shown how Habermas and Derrida would 
eventually affirm a shared philosophical-political position on the necessity of 
‘Enlightenment’. In the case of Foucault, such a convergence was already in progress 
while The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity was being written. 
 
In the supposedly oppositional dialogue between Habermas and Foucault 
concerning questions of modernity and the character and legacy of the Enlightenment, 
engagement with the work of Kant provides a shared point of reference. In particular, 
Kant’s 1784 essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’ is positioned by both theorists as 
embodying the self-aware and questioning progressive impulse that distinguishes the 
Enlightenment from earlier designations of the ‘modern’. Foucault publicised his 
thoughts on Kant and the Was ist Aufklärung? essay in a series of lectures given 
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between 1978 and 1983. These lectures, each distinctive while also similar in theme and 
content, demonstrate the evolution of Foucault’s engagement with this topic. In effect, 
they constitute an indirect dialogue with Habermas and his contemporary lecture-based 
critique of ‘post-modern’ and ‘post-structuralist’ thought that would eventually be 
published as The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. The dialogue between the two 
theorists would become increasingly direct until Foucault’s death in 1984 prevented any 
further engagement. However, in his memorial address to Foucault delivered that year, 
Habermas directly engages with one of Foucault’s lectures on Kant and the 
Enlightenment and indicates that the theoretical conceptions contained in this lecture 
alter the characterisation of Foucault’s philosophical positioning which he had 
previously advanced in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. 
 
 I do not seek to argue that Habermas and Foucault came to a rapprochement 
through simply agreeing with each other about the nature of the Enlightenment. Rather, 
by identifying the ways in which Foucault shares with Habermas a historicised, critical, 
but ultimately affirmative understanding of the legacy of the Enlightenment, I hope to 
show not only the useful insights that both theorists provide regarding such an 
understanding but also that the oppositional framing of the debate between them is 
largely a misreading which obscures the results of their constructive engagement. In 
short, Habermas and Foucault both recognise the continuing importance of a self-
critical project of progressive modernity as delineated by Kant. 
 
 The series of lectures and manuscripts in which Foucault specifically addresses 
the subject of Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’ were finally published together in 2007 
in a collection entitled The Politics of Truth. The title derives from Foucault’s 1978 
lecture on Kant, ‘What is Critique?’ which was delivered before the French Society of 
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Philosophy.71 In this lecture, Foucault identifies the process of ‘critique’, as exemplified 
by the questioning of existing institutions and traditions, as being both the central theme 
in Kant’s definition of ‘Enlightenment’ and the legacy of that period to modern thought. 
He states: 
I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the 
right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its 
discourses of truth. Well, then! Critique will be the art of voluntary 
insubordination and reflected intractability. It would essentially ensure the 
desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the 
politics of truth.72 
 
Foucault goes on to affirm that ‘in his attempt to desubjugate the subject in the context 
of power and truth, as a prolegomena [sic] to the whole present and future Aufklärung, 
Kant set forth critique’s primordial responsibility, to know knowledge’.73 In identifying 
the character of the Enlightenment and Kant’s definition of it in this manner, Foucault 
draws explicit links between the Kantian Aufklärung and his own philosophical 
concerns. In so doing, he seeks to properly position the historical context of the 
Enlightenment to establish the intellectual continuity that exists between the 
Enlightenment and early modernity.  
 
 Throughout the lecture, repeated reference is made to the importance of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the events of the Reformation in the development 
of critical discourses relating to truth and power. Foucault asserts that the history of 
critique within the western tradition revolves around the central question of ‘how [and 
how not] to be governed’.74 He cites the conflict with established Church authority over 
the interpretation of scripture during the Reformation as a crucial point in the 
development of a critique of established authority as an intellectual tradition in 
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Europe.75 He even goes so far as to suggest that the differing intellectual contexts of the 
classical Enlightenment within France and Germany are related to the fact that the 
German-speaking countries were part of the Reformation and France was not.76 In 
noting the particularity of the German intellectual tradition and its engagement with 
questions concerning both the nature of critique and the nature of modernity, he refers 
in passing to both the Frankfurt School and Habermas.77 If this lecture focuses on the 
link between critique and intellectual modernity, then Foucault’s next lecture on the 
subject of Kant and the Aufklärung goes further in seeking to establish what 
distinguishes the Enlightenment from early modernity and thus renders it unique. 
 
Foucault’s first lecture at the College de France in 1983 would be the text that 
Habermas would eventually engage with. It is known under several titles. He refers to it 
simply as Foucault’s lecture on Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’. However, the editor 
of The Politics of Truth gives it the title of ‘What is Revolution?’ to distinguish it from 
another essay by Foucault with the other title (not to mention Kant’s original essay). 
The editor’s choice of title derives from the focus of the lecture being not only on 
Kant’s ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ but also on his written reflections concerning the French 
Revolution. This is the lecture in which Foucault seeks to identify how the 
Enlightenment embodies a specifically self-conscious and progressive discourse of 
modernity, as opposed to the early modernity of the Renaissance and Reformation. His 
central observation about Kant’s Aufklärung essay is that ‘for the first time, one sees 
philosophy problematize its own discursive actuality’.78 He goes on to position the 
originality of the historical situation in the following way. 
No doubt one of the more interesting perspectives for the study of the 18th 
century, in general, and of the Aufklärung, in particular would be to examine the 
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fact that the Aufklärung named itself Aufklärung, that it is a very unique cultural 
process which became aware of itself by naming itself, by situating itself in 
terms of its past and its future, and by indicating how it had to operate within its 
own present.79 
 
Foucault situates Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’ essay as being a seminal event in the 
development of a European tradition of a self-conscious ‘modern philosophy’ that 
would become dominant from the end of the eighteenth century onwards.80 It was at this 
point, at the end of the century, that Kant would write what Foucault positions as a 
‘follow-up’ to the 1784 essay. Fourteen years later, in 1798, The Conflict of the 
Faculties was published.81 While this work ostensibly concerns the relations between 
the different faculties that comprise the structure of a university, Foucault argues that it 
is effectively a sequel to ‘What is Enlightenment?’ and, following the events in France, 
revolves around the question of ‘What is Revolution?’.82  
 
The Conflict of the Faculties is made up of three separate papers, and Foucault 
shows that the second paper, concerning the dispute between the School of Philosophy 
and the School of Law, is based around the question of whether human progress is 
possible.83 It is in this context that Kant refers to the example of the French Revolution. 
Foucault suggests that Kant measures progress in relation to the Revolution not in terms 
of political and structural change and upheaval, but in terms of a shift in human 
morality that results in people knowing that they can change and shape their own 
actuality.84 The self-aware attitude towards the idea of progress, as opposed to accepting 
its inevitability, is what matters according to Foucault. He states: 
There again the question for philosophy is not to determine which is the part of 
the Revolution that it would be most fitting to preserve and uphold as a model. 
The question is to know what must be done with this will for revolution, with 
this enthusiasm for the Revolution which is something other than the 
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revolutionary process itself. The two questions: ‘What is the Aufklärung?’ and 
‘What to do with the will for revolution?’ together define the field of 
philosophical questioning that is concerned with what we are in our present.85 
 
Foucault goes on to affirm that Kant is thus responsible for both of ‘the two great 
critical traditions which divide modern philosophy’.86 He argues that, on the one hand, 
much of Kant’s critical work is concerned with the question of ‘the conditions under 
which true knowledge is possible’ and that this ‘analytic of truth’, this search for the 
absolute objective laws of reality, is what underpins a major strand of modern 
philosophy since the nineteenth century.87 However, on the other hand, the Aufklärung 
essay and The Conflict of the Faculties are, according to Foucault, demonstrative of this 
other strand of critical thought, self-aware and questioning, that explores how people 
can define themselves and the time in which they live.88 Both intellectual traditions are 
legacies of the Enlightenment and Foucault positions himself as being part of the latter 
continuum. He concludes the lecture by affirming that the Kantian legacy presents 
practitioners of contemporary philosophical inquiry with a choice. 
It seems to me that the philosophical choice with which we are confronted at 
present is this: we can opt for a critical philosophy which will present itself as an 
analytic philosophy of truth in general, or we can opt for a form of critical 
thought which will be an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the actuality. It is 
this form of philosophy that, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, through 
Nietzsche and Max Weber, has founded the form of reflection within which I 
have attempted to work.89 
 
Foucault thus identifies himself as operating within the framework of an intellectual 
tradition which can be traced back to the Enlightenment and specifically to Kant, and 
which includes the Frankfurt School. He is positively affirming the continuing value of 
the Enlightenment to progressive philosophical thought and identifying himself with 
that project. 
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 It is therefore not surprising that in his memorial address for Foucault, 
Habermas engages with the text of this lecture in attempting to determine the complex 
relationship between this theorist and the Enlightenment. At the beginning of his 
address, Habermas recounts that the first and only time he met Foucault was in 1983 
and that the two agreed to meet the following year ‘with some American colleagues’ in 
order to discuss Kant’s ‘What is Enlightenment?90 Habermas states that at the time he 
was unaware of the ‘lecture on that very subject that Foucault had just given’ and only 
became aware of it following Foucault’s death, a death which prevented any further 
meeting between the two.91 Within this address, Habermas does not indicate that he is 
aware that Foucault has written other lectures and manuscripts on Kant and the 
Aufklärung and that the College de France ‘What is Revolution?’ lecture is thus one of a 
series of evolving but reasonably consistent reflections. However, given that Foucault 
and Habermas are perceived as embodying oppositional views concerning the legacy of 
the Enlightenment and the value of intellectual modernity, this memorial address 
represents something equivalent to a settling of accounts with Foucault on the part of 
Habermas. It entails an acknowledgement that Foucault, like Habermas, holds an 
ultimately positive conception of the Enlightenment as being an evolving and self-aware 
critical tradition, as opposed to being a static body of knowledge. 
 
 In both summarising and analysing Foucault’s account of the links between the 
two works by Kant, Habermas asserts that the picture of Kant that Foucault develops in 
this lecture is markedly different from the one he gives in The Order of Things.92 Kant 
as the seeker of objective truth is superseded by Kant as ‘the precursor to the Young 
Hegelians’, investigating how people assess their own contemporary reality.93 Of 
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course, this multi-faceted view of Kant on the part of Foucault is entirely consistent 
with his assertion in the lecture that the Prussian philosopher is the initiator of two 
differing traditions within modern philosophy. Habermas identifies the crux of 
Foucault’s observations, and poetically asserts that ‘Foucault discovers in Kant the first 
philosopher to take aim like an archer at the heart of a present that is concentrated in the 
significance of the contemporary moment, and thereby to inaugurate the discourse of 
modernity’.94 In making this statement, Habermas acknowledges that he and Foucault 
share a similar understanding of the Enlightenment as the crucible for a progressive, 
self-critical form of modernity. In summarising the final paragraph of the lecture, 
Habermas states: 
If this is even a paraphrase of Foucault’s own train of thought, the question 
arises how such an affirmative understanding of modern philosophising, a 
philosophising that is inscribed in our present and always directed to the 
relevance of our contemporary reality, fits with Foucault’s unyielding critique of 
modernity. How can Foucault’s self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition 
of the Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable critique of precisely 
this form of knowledge, which is that of modernity?95 
 
Habermas is perhaps trying to come to terms with the realisation that the criticisms of 
Foucault that he expounded in the lectures that would be published as part of The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity were overwrought, if not a misreading. 
Nonetheless, his defence that Foucault’s body of work is often contradictory in its 
arguments is reasonable. Habermas does in fact commend the way Foucault ‘perseveres 
in productive contradictions’.96 Given that this public valorisation of Foucault’s work 
dates from the year of his death, it demonstrates that the supposed querelle between the 
supposed ‘post-modernists’ and the successors of the Frankfurt School was already 
becoming redundant by the time it became received knowledge in the wider academic 
context. 
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 If both Derrida and Foucault are in fundamental agreement with Habermas in 
affirming, in differing ways, the progressive necessity of ‘Enlightenment’, then the 
theoretical basis of the dominant critique offered by some forms of cultural studies is 
weak and ahistorical. If Foucault did not argue that the legacy of the Enlightenment is 
simply oppressive, practitioners of cultural studies who advance this argument cannot 
correctly claim that it is based on either ‘post-modernist’ or ‘post-structuralist’ theory. 
The progressive actuality of the historical Enlightenment is the subject of Part Two of 
this dissertation. 
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Chapter Three 
Kant and Mendelssohn both reply to the ‘Question’: Moses Mendelssohn and Inclusive 
Citizenship 
 
As established in the previous chapter, Habermas and Foucault reached agreement in 
arguing that a critical and self-aware conception of modernity was the relevant legacy of 
the historical Enlightenment to contemporary theory. Furthermore, both theorists 
position Kant as being the central protagonist in this critical affirmation of the 
Enlightenment within its own time. However, Kant was certainly not the only 
contemporary intellectual to valorise the project of the Enlightenment while also 
recognising its problematic elements. Writing during the same period, the Berlin-based 
philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) was both a critic of and an advocate for 
the professed values of the Enlightenment. As a Prussian Jew, Mendelssohn used 
Enlightenment discourse as the intellectual framework for campaigning toward greater 
civil rights, religious freedoms, and social opportunities for Jewish people in the 
German states and elsewhere in Europe. Mendelssohn’s participation in the debates 
over the character of the Enlightenment is thus linked to a concrete political and social 
reformist project. 
 
In this chapter, I will show how the works of Kant and Mendelssohn intersect 
and how both display a nuanced attitude towards the relationship between 
Enlightenment values and social progress. To this end, I focus on specific texts and 
position these within historical and biographical context. In particular, I explore the 
importance of Jerusalem, Mendelssohn’s treatise on religious toleration, and Kant’s and 
Mendelssohn’s separate essays both entitled What is Enlightenment? 
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 The work of Moses Mendelssohn has to be understood within the context of the 
time and place in which he lived. His status as a member of the Jewish community, 
whose civil and religious rights and freedoms were markedly inferior to the other 
subjects of the absolute monarchy of Prussia, was fundamental to his philosophical 
project. This project was both nuanced and ambitious, as it advocated civic equality, 
religious freedom and social pluralism within the framework of enlightened absolutism. 
Crucially, Mendelssohn was advocating religious freedom not just in relation to the 
rights of Jewish subjects of the Prussian state but also in relation to theological debate 
and religious practice within the Jewish community itself. Mendelssohn is thus a 
seminal figure in the Haskala, the so-called ‘Jewish Enlightenment’ centred around 
European Jewish communities that would eventually lead to ‘Reform Judaism’. 
Mendelssohn’s intellectual project therefore has two tiers: it is both a programme of 
social and political reform based on concepts of inclusive citizenship and human rights 
as well as a philosophical and theological project of religious reform and spiritual 
inquiry. 
 
 Mendelssohn’s philosophy is therefore a synthesis of the ‘enlightenment’ model 
of critical thought and the much older tradition of critical scholarship within Judaism. 
Biographical studies of Mendelssohn point towards how such a synthesis developed, 
with Alexander Altmann’s 1973 biography remaining definitive. Mendelssohn was born 
in 1729 in the city of Dessau, the capital of the principality of Anhalt-Dessau to a father 
who was a Judaic scribe entrusted with copying Torah scrolls and writing other 
documents of Jewish law.97 Altmann describes how Mendelssohn’s birthplace was 
home to a significant Jewish community and was a centre of Judaic religious 
scholarship, assisted by the patronage of ‘court-Jews’, Jewish scholars who served as 
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advisors to princely and royal households and as such enjoyed their favour. In 
eighteenth century Europe, the ‘court-Jew’ therefore served as a significant link 
between the legal and social segregation of the ghetto and the upper echelons of 
society.98 Mendelssohn was thus literate in the tradition of Jewish scholarship from 
childhood. 
 
 Mendelssohn left Dessau for Berlin, the main city of Prussia, at the age of 
fourteen.99 It was here that he was gradually exposed to intellectual currents beyond 
Orthodox Judaism, despite the fact that he had come to Berlin for the specific purpose 
of furthering his Talmudic studies under the tutelage of the Chief Rabbi, David 
Frankel.100 The tradition of critical analysis within the Hamidrash led Mendelssohn to 
the study of later Jewish scholars, including the medieval Hispano-Jewish philosopher 
Maimonides. Altmann asserts that it was ‘his study of Maimonides that provided 
Moses’ first link with the modern Enlightenment’.101 Mendelssohn’s interest in 
developing his scholarly knowledge beyond Judaism led to him studying Latin in order 
to understand the writings of more contemporary European philosophers. 
 
 It was via the study of Latin that Mendelssohn encountered the writings of John 
Locke. Among the first non-classical Latin texts he studied was An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding.102 The first (near) contemporary philosopher whose writings 
Mendelssohn studied was thus one of the seminal and most important figures in 
Enlightenment thought. Locke would remain a significant influence on Mendelssohn’s 
philosophy, not just in terms of epistemology but also in relation to theories of religious 
toleration and civil society. Other modern philosophers whose work Mendelssohn 
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would become familiar with during this period include Leibniz, Wolff and Spinoza.103 
Mendelssohn’s attitude towards Spinoza was nuanced, as he admired much of the 
latter’s work and in some respects wished to emulate him while also remaining a devout 
follower of Judaism.104 The supposed contradiction between his status as an enlightened 
philosopher and his identity as an observant Jew is a re-occurring theme in 
Mendelssohn’s later career as a public intellectual. 
 
 This brief biographical summary demonstrates the multi-layered complexity of 
Mendelssohn’s intellectual formation. His first decade in Berlin incorporated 
completing his Talmudic studies while also reading other, more recent, Jewish thinkers 
including Maimonides and Spinoza as well as learning Latin and reading ‘modern’ 
philosophers including Locke and Leibniz. Mendelssohn’s intellectual basis as a 
philosopher thus combines an understanding of both Jewish theology, and the tradition 
of critical thinking that is constant within it, and the contemporary critical thought of 
the European Enlightenment. This synthesis that Mendelssohn works with therefore 
embodies a continuum of critical thinking in which Judaism and the Enlightenment are 
compatible elements in the expansion of human knowledge. Altmann describes the 
intellectual formation of the young Mendelssohn in the following, somewhat poetic, 
terms: 
What Mendelssohn achieved was the creation, within himself, of a rich interior 
world in which the Jewish heritage blended with the philosophy of the age, and 
which removed the barriers of the ghetto long before emancipation was 
considered in legal terms. What he dreamt of was not commercial success as the 
road to wider contacts but a wider intellectual horizon and the prospect of 
citizenship in the world of the Enlightenment. The vision of this goal did not 
come to him suddenly. Nor did he achieve it by his own unaided efforts: he was 
fortunate enough to find mentors to guide him. And yet the decisive impulse did 
come from within.105 
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It was through the patronage of a series of gentile friends and mentors that Mendelssohn 
was able to establish a public role as a writer and philosopher and, while he may not 
have been motivated by ‘commercial success’, entering into the management and later 
the ownership of a silk factory gave him the financial means and economic security to 
pursue that role.106 While much of Mendelssohn’s early work is beyond the thematic 
scope of this chapter, it established his legitimacy and reputation within the enlightened 
public sphere, thereby enabling the publication of his more politically focused later 
work. 
 
 Mendelssohn established his career as a published writer (beyond the Jewish 
religious community) by becoming a regular contributor to, and later editor of, his 
friend Friedrich Nicolai’s literary review Literaturbriefe in 1759.107 However, his 
reputation as a public philosopher and critic was aided by submitting the winning entry 
for the Royal Academy’s prize-essay competition in 1761.108 The essay question, 
pertaining to the difference between metaphysical and mathematical truth, elicited many 
submissions, including one from Kant.109 This was over twenty years before they would 
both submit essays on the question ‘What is Enlightenment?’ towards the end of their 
careers. Kant received the commendation for second place but was impressed with 
Mendelssohn’s successful entry.110 The two would correspond regularly over the next 
twenty years. Within four years of winning the prize, Mendelssohn would publish The 
Phaedon, a Socratic dialogue.111 This work, embodying the enlightened respect for 
classical sources, would secure Mendelssohn’s reputation as a philosopher. 
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Understanding Jerusalem 
Mendelssohn’s career as a public intellectual, or an inhabitant of the ‘republic of letters’ 
is based on his dual role as both a philosopher concerned largely with theological 
questions and as an advocate for the civil rights of a religious and ethnic minority. His 
mature work skilfully combines both of these roles. Indeed, as a philosopher focusing 
mainly on questions of theology, Mendelssohn positions his political advocacy in a 
manner that is just abstract and hypothetical enough to avoid being a direct attack on the 
Prussian state and the rule of the ‘enlightened’ monarch Frederick the Second (or ‘The 
Great’). Rather than make demands as an activist, as a philosopher he poses questions 
and crafts arguments that lead to self-evident conclusions. The political project of civil 
equality is supported by the philosophical project of arguing for religious pluralism and 
the validity of Judaism. 
 
 Official discrimination against Jews in eighteenth century Prussia was an 
intricate system of different levels of disadvantage. According to Altmann, in 1750 the 
existing system of discrimination was further codified through a royal edict issued by 
Frederick the Great.112 Prussian residents of Jewish origin were divided into six 
different categories or classes. The first four classes comprised the Schutzjuden or 
‘protected Jews’. The most senior class were those granted ‘general privilege’ which 
enabled freedom of movement within the city, equal commercial standing with 
Christian merchants, and the hereditary conferral of these privileges to all offspring. 
The second class of Schutzjuden had highly restricted freedom of movement and, in 
each family, only one child could inherit their protected status. The third class was 
comprised of skilled professionals whose protected status was not hereditary while the 
fourth class were the religious officials of the Jewish community whose protected status 
was also non-hereditary. The last two classes were ‘tolerated’ rather than ‘protected’. 
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Those in the fifth class had to depend on the patronage of protected Jews, had no 
privileges, and were unable to enter into either trade or the professions while the sixth 
class were private employees who were not permitted to stay in Berlin beyond the 
duration of their employment and were not allowed to marry.113 Such a level of 
stratification indicates the highly structured nature of the discrimination experienced by 
Jews in Berlin and Prussia. 
 
 The young Moses Mendelssohn was thus himself an ‘unprotected foreign Jew’ 
when he first came to Berlin to study under the patronage of the Chief Rabbi.114 
Frederick would eventually grant him protected status in 1763, following his success as 
a public philosopher and as a silk merchant. Over the following decade Mendelssohn 
would thus establish himself as the respectable and respected voice on behalf of the 
Jewish community in Berlin, using his standing and reputation to intervene and assist.115 
In the context of eighteenth-century Berlin, he embodies not only the traditional role of 
intercessor between the Jewish community and the gentile establishment, but also a 
connection between the ghetto and the ‘republic of letters’. 
 
Mendelssohn’s presence in the public sphere of writers and thinkers would test 
the contradictions and tensions within enlightened liberalism. A belief in ‘tolerance’ 
could be accompanied by a belief that Judaism was retrograde superstition. Kant’s 
friendship with Mendelssohn did not preclude him from expressing traditional views on 
the question of Jews and Judaism. In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 
first published in 1798 but older as a course of lectures, Kant recognises that the ‘civil 
status’ of Jews is ‘weak’.116 However, further on in a note to the text, he asserts that the 
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‘Palestinians living among us since their exile, or at least the great majority of them, 
have earned the not unfounded reputation of being cheaters, on account of their spirit of 
usury’.117 In re-instating this traditional slur, Kant fails to acknowledge that the 
dominance of Jews in the money-lending trade was due to legal restrictions since the 
Middle Ages. He goes on to characterise Judaism as an ‘ancient superstition’.118 Such 
hostility towards Jews and Judaism was expressed not only by philosophers who held 
atheist or deist positions but also by those who held that any truly enlightened person 
would recognise the truth of Christianity and therefore accept conversion. Mendelssohn 
encountered this attitude in the writer Johann Casper Lavater in what became known as 
the ‘Lavater Affair’.119  
 
 The ‘Lavater Affair’ entailed Mendelssohn having to both assert and defend his 
position as a religiously devout Jew while avoiding the appearance of attacking 
Christianity and the figure of Christ. It was a controversy that he was reluctantly drawn 
into due to Lavater’s actions. Lavater was an ‘enlightened’ theologian who had 
personally known Mendelssohn since 1763.120 Over the course of the next few years, 
Lavater and Mendelssohn had several private conversations on matters of philosophy 
and theology. At some point, Mendelssohn made a statement to the effect that as a 
philosopher he had respect for the moral character of Jesus as a man.121 Lavater 
interpreted this to mean that Mendelssohn was open to conversion to Christianity. 
Mendelssohn would later claim that his willingness to discuss matters of Christian 
theology was prompted by Lavater’s insistence and that there was assumed to be an 
understanding that such conversations would remain private.122 As a theologian, Lavater 
had previously argued in his writings that the ‘second coming’ of Christ was predicated 
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on the conversion of all Jews to Christianity.123 He was therefore motivated by a strong 
personal belief in hoping to facilitate Mendelssohn’s conversion. 
 
 The shift from private debate to public controversy occurred in 1769.124 That 
year Lavater published his German translation of Genevan philosopher Charles 
Bonnet’s treatise on the truth of Christianity, La Palingenesie. This translation was 
prefaced by a dedication from Lavater to Mendelssohn. In this dedication, Lavater 
directs fulsome praise towards Mendelssohn’s ‘excellence’ as both a philosopher and as 
a man, lauding him as ‘an Israelite in whom there is no guile’.125 He goes on to state ‘I 
shall never forget the sweet modesty with which you look upon Christianity, despite 
your remoteness from it; nor shall I forget the philosophical respect which … you 
expressed for the moral character of its founder’.126 Having disclosed the nature of a 
private conversation, Lavater goes on to request of Mendelssohn that he not only read 
this translation of Bonnet’s work but that he publicly state as a philosopher whether or 
not he agrees with Bonnet’s arguments concerning the truth of Christianity.127 The 
dedication was thus essentially a form of public intellectual and moral blackmail. 
 
  In his public reply to Lavater’s challenge, Mendelssohn employed lines of 
argument that would be further developed in Jerusalem. After some initial drafting, he 
decided that his reply would explicitly avoid debating questions of theological truth and 
instead focus on principles of religious and philosophical toleration and pluralism.128 He 
adopted a philosophical position, as opposed to a theological one. His reply did 
however contain a defence of Judaism as a valid belief system based on tolerance and 
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morality.129 His argument that Judaism is tolerant was based on the principle that it does 
not seek to convert non-believers.130 In an argument that would be further developed 
and re-affirmed in both Jerusalem and On the Question: What is Enlightenment?, 
Mendelssohn valorises personal and public morality over the ‘truth’ of any particular 
religious creed.131 However, as I will show, religion and morality are still very much 
interlinked in Mendelssohn’s philosophy. The Letter to Lavater was published in 
1770.132 It signifies Mendelssohn’s increased willingness to engage publicly with 
questions relating to the place of Jews in society, culminating in the publication of 
Jerusalem over a decade later. 
 
 Traditional anti-Semitism could be re-inscribed during the Enlightenment. 
Voltaire is the most noted example of this tendency. Mendelssohn disliked Voltaire on 
account of his anti-Semitism, his antipathy to organised religion and because of a 
general quality of superficiality that Mendelssohn ascribed to the French philosophes.133 
The French Enlightenment is, with some exceptions, not the Enlightenment that 
Mendelssohn subscribes to. Aside from contemporaries including Kant, his 
philosophical basis is informed by the early Enlightenment of the seventeenth century. 
John Locke, as noted above, together with Christian Wolff and Samuel von Pufendorf, 
were formative influences on Mendelssohn. This type of philosophy, combining the 
study of natural law with projects of civil reform, is a major influence on the conception 
of civil and religious rights and freedoms that Mendelssohn presents in Jerusalem. 
 
 The civil philosophy that Pufendorf and his followers developed in the German 
states during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries is significantly different 
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from the metaphysical philosophy espoused by Kant during the late eighteenth century. 
However, the former is of equal significance in the historical development of 
enlightenment thought. This is the argument put forward by Ian Hunter in his book 
Rival Enlightenments. Hunter asserts that the importance of ‘Pufendorfian’ civil 
philosophy to the historical formation of enlightened intellectual discourse has been 
largely obscured by the contemporary scholarly focus on Kantian metaphysics as the 
main legacy of the German Enlightenment.134 These two differing approaches to 
questions concerning the nature of the human subject and society embody ‘rival’ 
tendencies within the Enlightenment. As I will show, Mendelssohn’s philosophy 
employs a unique synthesis of these opposing traditions. 
 
Pursuing a consciously revisionist line of argument, Hunter reconstructs the 
origins of this civil philosophy, demonstrating that the instituting of concepts such as 
religious freedom and toleration owe more to pragmatic and anti-metaphysical 
strategies of statecraft than the self-conscious promotion of ‘reason’ associated with the 
‘high’ Enlightenment. He states: 
Our initial sketch of a ‘civil enlightenment’ – pre-dating the philosophical 
Aufklärung by a century or more, and arising from sources quite other than the 
‘work of thought’ – would therefore seem to find its moorings in a substantial 
body of historical work. Here, there is significant consensus that a civil 
enlightenment – that is, the first moves to establish religious toleration, 
detheologise politics, separate civil society from religious community – emerged 
as a response to the devastation of religious civil war.135 
 
Hunter therefore situates the political and religious reforms advocated by Pufendorf and 
his followers including Christian Thomasius within the historical context of the Thirty 
Years War having only recently ended. Policies of religious toleration were promoted 
because such policies aided the security of the state. This process of the ‘desacralisation 
of politics’, as Hunter terms it, therefore had its theoretical basis not in ‘university 
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metaphysics or moral philosophy’ but in a mode of civil philosophy that comprised 
‘natural law, political law, neo-Aristotelian and neo-Stoic political sciences, [and] civic 
republicanism’.136 Such a process resulted in the ‘first liberal freedoms’ being instituted 
with the absence of any liberal-rationalist idealism.137 Pufendorf’s attitude to notions of 
human perfectibility can appear contradictory. He views the human subject as being 
intrinsically moral and ‘equipped by nature to know the natural law’ but also as being 
unable to ‘govern himself in accordance with it’.138 Therefore, he views a strong state as 
being necessary for social peace. Hunter summarises the political and social vision of 
the natural law theorists in the following terms. 
The state envisaged by Pufendorf and Thomasius was one that pursued external 
security through diplomacy and war, and internal security through the 
development of a novel and powerful double strategy. This strategy required the 
state’s indifference to the transcendent values of its constituent moral 
communities – an indifference they would experience as civil freedom – and its 
readiness to suppress all conduct threatening social peace, no matter what the 
source.139 
 
By way of analogy, one could argue that this vision is close to the theories of John 
Locke in relation to freedom of conscience but close to the theories of Thomas Hobbes 
in relation to state security. Hunter himself argues against viewing Pufendorf’s 
conception of society as being merely authoritarian. He stresses that the liberalism of 
Pufendorf’s position in arguing for the withdrawal of the state from interference in the 
religious beliefs of its citizens must be recognised.140 The fact that it is not sufficiently 
recognised is because, according to Hunter, a proto-liberalism that rejects ideas of 
innate human rationality and perfectibility cannot be easily assimilated into histories of 
Enlightenment thought, hence the greater focus on Kantian moral philosophy.141 
Pufendorf’s theories represent a ‘practical’ enlightenment. As I will show, Moses 
Mendelssohn subscribed to the classically ‘high enlightenment’ belief in human reason 
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and perfectibility. However, in devising his picture of a pluralistic and tolerant society, 
as envisaged in Jerusalem, he draws on the ideas of Pufendorf and the ‘natural law’ 
civil philosophy of the early enlightenment. 
 
 Jerusalem or On Religious Power and Judaism, first published in 1783, 
demonstrates the mature synthesis of Mendelssohn’s intellectual endeavours. His 
lifelong engagement with both the study of Judaism and the modern philosophy of the 
Enlightenment(s) converges with his civic role as an advocate for the Jews of Berlin and 
Prussia. In his work, Essays in Jewish Intellectual History, Altmann states that 
‘although the plea for Jewish emancipation is not the overt theme of the book, no one 
reading it could fail to see the implications of Mendelssohn’s political theory’.142 
Mendelssohn builds on Locke’s concepts of religious toleration and the separation of 
church and state to advance the idea of cultural pluralism within the framework of a 
secular, but not irreligious, polity. In relation to this, Mendelssohn outlines what the 
rights and duties of citizens of such a state would be. In addition to being a treatise on 
religious toleration and civil equality, Jerusalem is also a valorisation of Judaism as a 
religion and moral code to a mostly gentile readership inculcated with anti-Semitic 
prejudices. As a combined work of philosophy, theology and political reform, it 
exemplifies the advocacy within enlightened discourse of progressive change. 
 
Theories relating to the idea of ‘the social contract’, as formulated in different 
ways by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, influence Mendelssohn’s conception of civil 
rights and responsibilities that he puts forward in Jerusalem. However, as a philosopher 
influenced by the ‘natural law’ concepts of Wolff and Pufendorf, he believes that such 
rights and responsibilities are not created through the social contract but exist prior to 
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it.143 Unlike Pufendorf however, Mendelssohn views the human subject as being 
innately reasonable and moral.144 The state cannot be an instrument to create the rights 
and responsibilities of its citizens but it can be used to secure them. Civil justice is the 
logical fulfilment of natural justice. 
 
 Writing in Jerusalem, Mendelssohn acknowledges the work of Hobbes and 
Locke in developing theories of government and civil society.145 However, while he 
strongly agrees with Locke that the state must not enforce religious dogma, he also 
rejects a strict separation between spiritual and temporal power. Mendelssohn fears that, 
in a strictly secular society, people will lose the spiritual awareness that he considers 
necessary for their moral conduct as citizens. He paraphrases Judaic teaching in order to 
emphasise this point, writing that the ‘rabbins liken this life to a lobby, in which we are 
to fit ourselves in the manner we wish to appear in the inner room’.146 Mendelssohn 
views recognition of the sacred as fundamental to civil society while also arguing that 
the state should have no coercive powers in relation to enforcing religious belief. He 
therefore also rejects the concept of a state church or of the coercive power of such an 
institution. He writes: 
Neither State nor Church has … a right to submit the principles and persuasions 
of men to any compulsion whatsoever. Neither Church nor State is entitled to 
connect rights over persons, or claims to things with principles and persuasions; 
and to weaken, by extraneous admixture, the influence of the force of truth on 
the discerning faculty. Not even the social compact could concede such a right 
to either State or Church.147 
 
Mendelssohn’s argument that the Church (in using that term, he also includes other 
religious institutions) should not have coercive powers once more reveals the influence 
of early enlightenment ‘natural law’ philosophy on his thought. According to Altmann, 
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he follows Pufendorf in viewing churches and other religious institutions as collegial 
bodies. Within this interpretation, the Church is a ‘free association of like-minded 
individuals, established by contract’ as opposed to being ‘a divinely founded mystical 
body’.148 According to Mendelssohn, both civil states and religious communities are 
designed by social contracts based on the moral obligations of natural law. Therefore, 
the civil exclusion of the Jews from Prussian society has no logically justifiable basis. 
As Altmann writes: 
By emphasising the moral function of religion, Mendelssohn found a way of 
integrating the church into the state’s sphere of interest without permitting any 
state influence in the theologies and internal affairs of the various churches. By 
the same token he placed all religions on one and the same level vis-à-vis the 
state. Again, the principle of equality was asserted, and seeing that the Jew was 
being discriminated against on purely religious grounds, it followed with 
inexorable logic that the denial of civil equality to the Jew was unjustifiable.149 
 
What Mendelssohn advocates in Jerusalem is not just religious toleration, in the manner 
of Locke, but religious and civil equality. A secular state is positioned as being a 
necessary pre-condition for genuine religious freedom and spiritual morality. The logic 
of his argument means that he not only supports the equality of the Jewish community 
with the rest of society but toleration within it. He argues against the use of herem, the 
Judaic equivalent of excommunication, because it is incompatible with his critique of 
coercive religious power.150  
 
 Mendelssohn can balance his belief in divine truth with his argument against 
coercion by either church or state in matters of religion and conscience because of his 
attachment to principles of natural law and human rationality, in accordance with the 
ideals of the Enlightenment. As stated above, his conception of human nature is based 
on the understanding that people have an innate capacity to be moral and reasonable. He 
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therefore argues that divine truth can become evident through reason, without the need 
for coercion. He writes: 
I … do not believe that the resources of human reason are inadequate to the 
persuading of mankind of the eternal truths requisite for their happiness; and that 
God had need to reveal them to them in a preternatural manner.151 
 
Mendelssohn therefore combines his devout faith in Judaism with a typically 
enlightened belief in ‘rational religion’. His belief in the human capacity for reason is 
consistent with the enlightened belief in human perfectibility. The concept of ‘rational 
religion’ is a central trope within the Enlightenment, particularly for those philosophers 
who sought to criticise ‘superstition’ while also attacking atheism. Kant’s Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, which was first published in instalments in 1792 
before being published as a whole the following year, contains some significant 
similarities to Jerusalem in that it presents an argument for religious freedom while also 
positioning religious belief as being central to the moral conduct of the individual in 
society. Kant’s Religion builds on the arguments put forward in both the Critique of 
Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. As with Mendelssohn, morality is 
central to Kant’s conception of the enlightened and tolerant state. He re-iterates his 
concept of the ‘moral law’ and links it to the traditional Christian themes of original sin 
and ‘radical evil’.152 He also puts forward the concept of the ‘ethical community’ and 
links it to religious faith.153 As with Mendelssohn, Kant makes an explicit connection 
between religious toleration and spiritual morality. He states that ‘moral faith must be a 
free faith, founded on pure dispositions of the heart’.154 This statement is also consistent 
with the central tenet of rationalist theology, echoed in the passage from Mendelssohn 
featured above, that genuine religious belief is acquired through reason as opposed to 
being enforced by state coercion. Kant terms the former type of religious belief as 
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‘pure’ while the latter is described as ‘ecclesiastical’.155 However, Kant’s conception of 
religious toleration and rationality is in some respects more traditional and coercive than 
Mendelssohn’s. 
 
 While Mendelssohn does not seek to convert people to Judaism, Kant’s 
arguments in the Religion are to some extent a re-inscription of traditional German 
Protestant belief as the ‘pure’ faith. In relation to this, it must be noted that Kant argues 
in the Religion that Judaism should not be considered a genuine religious faith and that 
it is not as morally advanced as Christianity.156 Nonetheless, the dominant scholarly 
view of Kant’s Religion is that it embodies the enlightenment discourse of religious 
liberty and freedom of conscience and it is for this reason that the Prussian authorities 
attempted to suppress the publication of its second volume. In his introduction to the 
1998 ‘Cambridge Texts’ edition of the Religion, Robert Merrihew Adams states that 
‘one of the themes that runs through all Kant’s writings collected in this volume is his 
fervent advocacy of freedom of belief and expression’. Adams situates the attempted 
censorship of the Religion as being the result of Frederick II, who died in 1786, being 
succeeded by Frederick William II who, he states, ‘was much more conservative in 
these matters’. He goes on to position the Religion as reflecting ‘Kant’s grave concern 
about the direction of events in Prussia’.157 Hunter in Rival Enlightenments challenges 
this mode of reading Kant and the Religion, in which enlightened values of tolerance are 
positioned as being under threat from conservative reaction. 
 
Hunter questions whether Kant’s model of ‘rational religion’, based on linking 
his moral metaphysics with a particular interpretation of Protestant belief, can genuinely 
be considered progressive, and whether attempts by the government of Frederick 
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William to censor the Religion should be considered as simply reactionary. He argues 
that Kant sought to position his rationalist theology within Lutheran institutions, thus 
leading towards the establishment of a confessional state religion.158 Within this 
context, the edict issued by Frederick William’s Minister of Education and Religious 
Affairs, Johann Christoph Wollner – which continued the practice of religious toleration 
while ordering theologians and religious leaders to desist from public proselytising and 
public experimentation – can be seen as an attempt to preserve toleration rather than as 
an attack upon it. According to this interpretation, the edict can be positioned within the 
tradition of Pufendorf’s civil enlightenment. As Hunter states: 
The edict repeats the post-Westphalian toleration of the three main confessions 
and in fact extends this to all sects not engaged in public proselytising.… This at 
least allows us to offer an alternative historical interpretation of the attempt to 
censor Kant’s Religion. Rather than representing a reactionary political-religious 
attempt to repress the so-called Aufklärung, this act can be seen as an instance of 
the state’s long standing policy of forestalling public religious controversy and 
managing religious enthusiasm – here the enthusiasm of rationalist religious 
intellectuals.159 
 
According to this line of argument, the Prussian state was seeking to prevent Kant from 
prescribing his model of the true religion and thereby disrupting the delicate balance of 
religious pluralism. By comparison, Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem is a far less prescriptive 
work and may therefore be considered a better example of enlightened theology. 
 
Jerusalem thus precedes Kant’s Religion and foreshadows many of its 
arguments as both a work of rationalist theology and social planning. However, while 
arguing for respect and freedom to be extended towards the followers of Judaism, 
Mendelssohn is not seeking to prescribe it for everyone as the true or ‘pure’ religion. In 
many respects, Jerusalem embodies the classically liberal tendency in Enlightenment 
political discourse. The closing paragraph of the book demonstrates its essentially 
liberal character. 
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Let everyone who does not disturb public happiness, who is obedient to the civil 
government, who acts righteously towards you, and towards his fellow 
countrymen, be allowed to speak as he thinks, to pray to God after his own 
fashion … and to seek eternal salvation where he thinks he may find it. Suffer 
no one to be a searcher of hearts, and a judge of opinions in your states; suffer 
no one to assume a right which the Omniscient has reserved to himself.160 
 
In outlining a system of both individual and collective rights and freedoms within the 
framework of a secular state, Jerusalem is representative of enlightened modernity. In 
the year of its publication, Mendelssohn would also attempt to answer the question of 
what exactly Enlightenment is. 
 
Kant and Mendelssohn both ask ‘What is Enlightenment?’ 
James Schmidt, in the preface to What is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers 
and Twentieth-Century Questions, a collection of both primary and secondary texts, 
identifies German-speaking Europe as being at the forefront of the self-investigation of 
what constituted enlightenment. He states: 
While the Enlightenment was a European event, the debate on the question 
‘what is enlightenment?’ was uniquely German. For reasons that defy easy 
explanation, neither French philosophes nor Scottish moralists (to name only the 
two most likely parties) were as concerned as their German-speaking colleagues 
with the question of what enlightenment was.161 
 
It was the prominence of public discourse about ‘enlightened’ ideas that resulted in the 
question ‘what is enlightenment?’ being asked as part of a footnote to an article by the 
theologian Johann Friedrich Zollner, published in the Berlinische Monatsschriftt in 
1783.162 It was as a response to this question that Kant wrote his noted essay What is 
Enlightenment? published the following year. While it is not as well known, another 
essay in response to the question was written by Mendelssohn and also published in 
1784.163 Kant and Mendelssohn both attempt to define the nature of the ‘die 
Aufklärung’. Kant’s essay is, of course, widely known in the context of historical 
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studies and cultural commentary on the Enlightenment as the foremost example of a 
contemporary explanation of the period by someone who has since been positioned 
within the ‘canon’ of Enlightenment thinkers. Therefore, given that much has been 
written on What is Enlightenment? I will focus on identifying the most salient features. 
 
 The opening statement of Kant’s essay defines ‘Enlightenment’ as ‘mankind’s 
exit from its self-incurred immaturity’.164 This last phrase, or selbstverschuldeten 
Unmundigkeit, is a recurring concept in this essay and in much of Kant’s other work.165 
He explains that this ‘immaturity’ is ‘self-incurred’ because ‘its cause lies not in the 
lack of understanding but rather in the lack of the resolution and the courage to use it 
without the guidance of another’.166 He goes on to declare ‘Sapere aude! Have the 
courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment’.167 ‘Sapere 
aude’ is the Latin for ‘Dare to know’ and the phrase is closely associated with popular 
understandings of the Enlightenment, both then and now. Towards the end of the essay, 
Kant reiterates the importance of the concept of using one’s own understanding and 
relates it to the meaning of the Enlightenment as an epoch. He states: 
If it is asked ‘Do we now live in an enlightened age?’ the answer is ‘No, but we 
do live in an age of enlightenment.’ As matters now stand, much is still lacking 
for men to be completely able – or even to be placed in a situation where they 
would be able – to use their own reason confidently and properly in religious 
matters without the guidance of another. Yet we have clear indications that the 
field is now being opened for them to work freely toward this, and the obstacles 
to general enlightenment or to the exit out of their self-incurred immaturity 
become ever fewer. In this respect, this age is the age of enlightenment or the 
century of Frederick.168 
 
The deference that Kant exhibits towards Frederick and the Prussian state is evident in 
how he frames the relationship between enlightenment and intellectual freedom. Kant 
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draws a distinction between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ use of reason.169 However, this 
distinction does not follow what might be considered the most obvious logic. Rather 
than situating the private as the sphere in which people may exercise intellectual 
freedom separate from their public duties, he inverts the binary. The ‘public use of 
reason’ refers to the public sphere where people (meaning educated men of letters) can 
exercise their intellectual freedom and engage in debate provided that they obediently 
discharge their duties in regard to whatever profession they may be in.170 A clergyman, 
teacher or army officer (to use some of Kant’s examples) can engage in free debate in 
the public sphere but they must obey in the private context when carrying out their 
duties. 
 
By formulating the distinction in this way, Kant expressly aims to provide a 
framework in which intellectual and cultural enlightenment can proceed without 
jeopardising the ‘civil order’ and harmonious functioning of the state.171 He suggests 
with approval that the maxim of the Prussian Enlightenment under Frederick should be 
‘argue, as much as you want and about whatever you want, only obey!’.172 He also 
asserts that such a division of intellectual freedom is only workable in the context of an 
enlightened absolute monarchy and would not work in a republican context.173 
 
Mendelssohn approaches the same question from a different perspective. 
Mendelssohn is sensitive to questions of religious and cultural tradition. In his essay, he 
draws a distinction between ‘enlightenment’ and ‘culture’ and he views both as being 
components of ‘education’.174 He defines ‘culture’ as ‘goodness, refinement, and beauty 
in the arts and social mores’ while he suggests that ‘enlightenment’ is related to 
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‘theoretical matters: to (objective) rational knowledge and to (subjective) facility in 
rational reflection about matters of human life, according to their importance and 
influence on the destiny of man’.175  
 
Therefore, within Mendelssohn’s framework, ‘culture’ constitutes the practical 
requirements of living a good and civilised life whereas ‘enlightenment’ constitutes the 
theoretical and intellectual basis for it. By way of comparative example he writes that 
‘the French [have] more culture, the English more enlightenment’.176 This statement 
reflects Mendelssohn’s ambivalence towards the French mode of ‘enlightenment’. As is 
typical of the advocates of enlightenment, he stresses the idea of human progress, 
stating ‘I posit, at all times, the destiny of man as the measure and goal of all our 
striving and efforts, as a point on which we must set our eyes, if we do not wish to lose 
our way’.177 He goes on to divide the ‘destiny of man’ into the respective pathways of 
‘man as man’ and ‘man as citizen’.178 Such a division correlates with his belief in 
‘natural law’ philosophy. 
 
Just as Mendelssohn positions ‘enlightenment’ as being on a higher plane than 
‘culture’, he equates destiny ‘as man’ with ‘enlightenment’ and destiny ‘as citizen’ with 
‘culture’. He asserts that ‘Man as man needs no culture: but he needs enlightenment’.179 
He writes ‘Unfortunate is the state that must confess that for it the essential destiny of 
man is not in harmony with the essential destiny of its citizens’.180 This statement is of 
particular significance given Mendelssohn’s political project to extend the rights and 
status of full citizenship to Prussian Jews, and is in accordance with the arguments 
expressed in Jerusalem. However, as with Kant, his belief in enlightenment and 
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progress is balanced by a belief in the necessity of restraint and the importance of 
culture and tradition. He states: 
The misuse of enlightenment weakens the moral sentiment and leads to hard-
heartedness, egoism, irreligion, and anarchy. Misuse of culture produces luxury, 
hypocrisy, weakness, superstition, and slavery. Where enlightenment and culture 
go forward in step, they are together the best shield against corruption.181 
 
As he explains at the beginning of the essay, such a fusion of culture and enlightenment 
constitutes education and he concludes his piece on ‘What is Enlightenment’ by 
stressing the importance of an educated nation. However, his conclusion has a 
pessimistic quality even as he extols the idea of progress. He concludes by writing that a 
‘nation that through education has come to the highest peak of national happiness is just 
for that reason in danger of collapse, because it can climb no higher’ ending with ‘but 
this leads us too far from the question at hand’.182 This pessimistic belief in a correlation 
between the peak of enlightened development and the advent of social collapse 
foreshadows the thesis of Adorno and Horkheimer as expounded in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. There is evidence that Adorno was aware of the writings of 
Mendelssohn. In the eighth lecture in his series on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 
Adorno refers to earlier descriptions of Kant as being the ‘all-destroyer’ in relation to 
such a critique of reason.183 According to the Editor’s Notes, this description of Kant 
originated with Mendelssohn who, in his final work The Mourning Hours or Lectures 
on the Existence of God, refers to the ‘all-destroying Kant’. Arthur Schopenhauer later 
paraphrases this to refer to Kant as the ‘all-destroyer’.184 Perhaps Adorno’s use of this 
expression demonstrates familiarity with Schopenhauer rather than Mendelssohn. 
However, the philosophies of Adorno and Mendelssohn are connected by the way in 
which both men, in different times, were to measure the success or failure of 
enlightenment values against the reality of their lived experience as German Jews. 
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Adorno’s critique of the Enlightenment derives from having witnessed the corruption of 
modernity that Mendelssohn forewarns against over a hundred years earlier. However, 
Mendelssohn’s experience leads him to place an ambivalent hope in enlightenment 
values. 
 
 Despite their differences, Kant and Mendelssohn both embody a tendency 
within enlightened discourse that stresses moral seriousness. Both philosophers believe 
strongly in progressive social change but both argue that such change must not come at 
the expense of certain cultural concepts that are of foundational importance to a 
civilised and moral society. Mendelssohn has the ambivalence of someone who has the 
experience of being on the margins of society. He is therefore not a naive utopian. His 
enlightened belief in reason and human perfectibility is balanced by a strong recognition 
that people have a capacity for evil that must be controlled through some kind of moral 
order that can serve to protect the rights of all. While such a view demonstrates the 
influence of his religious beliefs, it is also indicative of the profoundly moral conception 
of the Enlightenment that Mendelssohn advocates. He is aware that appealing to human 
rationality alone is not sufficient to protect human rights and dignity. Conversely, he is 
equally aware that belief in human reason is fundamental to any project that seeks to 
protect and expand human dignity. The philosophers of the European Enlightenment all 
too often failed to extend their professed values to the Jewish Diaspora. However, 
Mendelssohn, in recognising the emancipatory potential of enlightened discourse, uses 
these values to move towards the conception of a secular and inclusive cosmopolitan 
society. 
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Chapter Four 
Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges and the Defence of Reason and Virtue 
 
The historical European Enlightenment is also referred to as the ‘age of reason’. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter on Kant and Mendelssohn, Foucault’s question 
about how such ‘reason’ is identified was being asked at the time. The same is true of 
the ongoing theoretical discussion about the gendered value of the concepts of reason 
and rationality. By the time of the late or ‘high’ historical ‘Enlightenment’, the link 
between ‘reason’ and the ‘rights of Man’ was explicitly made. The character of 
enlightened reason was two-fold. Men had innate or natural rights because of their 
capacity for reason or rational thought but reason was itself positioned as an over-
arching progressive impulse that challenged arbitrary power and tradition while 
advancing human perfectibility. The enlightened discourse on reason was and is 
gendered and yet feminism in its broadest sense can be considered, for all that, part of 
the Enlightenment project. The relationship between feminism and the enlightenment is 
thus paradoxical. This statement is made with the awareness that there is no singular 
‘feminism’ and no singular ‘Enlightenment’. The salient point is that the paradox was 
recognised and interrogated at the time. This chapter turns to two specific instances of 
this. 
 
While there were significant numbers of women writers and intellectuals in 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe who can be identified as being (proto) 
feminist, this chapter will focus on Mary Wollstonecraft in Britain and Olympe de 
Gouges in France and their efforts to insert the question of gender into the debates over 
reason and rights occurring at the time of the French Revolution during the final decade 
of the eighteenth century. For both writers, advocacy of women’s rights was 
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intrinsically linked to the affirmation of the ‘rights of man’ in a universal sense. 
Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman followed on from her reply to 
Edmund Burke, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, while de Gouges’s The Rights of 
Woman was directly modelled on the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen’ 
drawn up by the National Assembly in revolutionary France in 1789. This does not 
mean, however, that Wollstonecraft and de Gouges simply position women’s rights as 
being merely an extension of men’s rights. They both interrogate the concept of gender 
and gendered reason while affirming the necessity of reason to human progress and 
emancipation in general. 
 
Wollstonecraft and de Gouges were thus involved in the ongoing debate over the 
relationship between feminism and enlightened reason from its inception. The tensions 
and contradictions contained in their writings pre-figure the ambivalence with which the 
legacy of the historical Enlightenment is viewed within feminist scholarship. As Sarah 
Knott and Barbara Taylor, in their introduction to the edited book Women, Gender and 
Enlightenment, state: 
Enlightenment is contentious. Once an age of reason, tolerance and 
emancipation, today it is routinely characterised as repressive and incipiently 
totalitarian.... Its record on women is indicted, with leading philosophes damned 
as misogynists in new dress while women who affirm enlightened values – like 
Wollstonecraft – are condemned for colluding with the oppressor. Meanwhile 
champions of Enlightenment vigorously defend its progressive credentials, 
including its record on gender issues.185 
 
The legacy of the Enlightenment for feminist thought cannot be reduced to a question of 
either/or. Both Wollstonecraft and de Gouges demonstrate this by engaging in a process 
of valorising and repudiating different aspects of enlightenment thought. 
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In her path-breaking critique of the gendered values within western philosophy, 
The Man of Reason, Genevieve Lloyd is careful to affirm that such criticism should not 
entail a complete rejection of the tradition of rationalist thought. She states with firm 
clarity that the ‘claim that reason is male need not at all involve sexual relativism about 
truth, or any suggestion that principles of logical thought valid for men do not hold also 
for female reasoners’.186 Such a statement echoes the famous comment made by 
Wollstonecraft about the meaning of truth – see the section on Wollstonecraft’s re-
framing of virtue later in this chapter. Lloyd goes on to assert the necessity of rational 
critique to any project of feminist philosophical inquiry. 
Philosophers can take seriously feminist dissatisfaction with the maleness of 
Reason without repudiating either Reason or philosophy. Such criticisms of 
ideals of Reason can in fact be seen as continuous with a very old strand in the 
western philosophical tradition; it has been centrally concerned with bringing to 
reflective awareness the deeper structures of inherited ideals of Reason. 
Philosophy has defined ideals of Reason through exclusions of the feminine. But 
it also contains within it the resources for critical reflection on those ideals and 
on its own aspirations.187 
 
This statement can serve as a useful lodestone for feminist scholarship, or indeed for 
any progressive critique of the historical Enlightenment and its legacy. Reason can only 
be reformed through reason. This is why Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges 
remain relevant to feminist thought in demonstrating a reflective engagement with the 
Enlightenment while being contemporary protagonists within it. 
 
 Mary Wollstonecraft is, of course, a widely known historical figure, situated 
both as a ‘pioneering feminist’ and increasingly as an emblematic thinker and writer of 
the Enlightenment and Romantic eras. Much writing on Wollstonecraft over the past 
two hundred years has been focused on her personal life, particularly her position as the 
eventual wife of William Godwin and the mother of Mary Shelley. Olympe de Gouges 
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is a less well-known figure, particularly outside France. However, scholarship on the 
questions of women’s rights and activism within the public sphere during the first 
French Revolution has led to an increasing awareness of her life and writings. The two 
women were contemporaries and wrote on similar (at times identical) subjects and 
questions. Although their approaches and conclusions can differ, they are united by a 
shared advocacy for the rights of women and men within the philosophical framework 
of the Enlightenment and a belief in enlightened progress. This has led to both women 
becoming increasingly popular subjects for scholarly research because they can be 
easily positioned as recognisably proto-feminist figures.188 However, for purposes of the 
present analysis, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges are positioned not only as (proto) 
feminist thinkers but also more specifically as Enlightenment philosophers who asked 
how the predominant enlightened themes of reason, natural rights and civic virtue could 
be connected to a project of egalitarian citizenship which encompassed women. 
 
Wollstonecraft as Enlightened Philosopher 
In Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination, Barbara Taylor expressly situates 
the English writer within the historical and social context of the late Enlightenment and 
the radicalism of the period around the French Revolution. Taylor argues that how 
Wollstonecraft and her writings are perceived has constantly shifted according to the 
ideological and social context of the different historical periods in which her life and 
work has been evaluated, particularly within the sphere of feminist activism and 
scholarship. 
Every feminist generation reinvents her: to late nineteenth-century women’s 
rights activists, struggling in the suffocating embrace of the ‘angel in the house’, 
she appeared a classic Victorian individualist, laying claim to those qualities – 
independence, self-regulation, self-reliance – valued in Victorian men but denied 
to their womenfolk. To fin-de-siecle New Women she personified romantic 
bohemianism, while to leftwing women like Eleanor Marx and Emma Goldman 
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she was the embodiment of the democratic spirit, an ‘indomitable’ champion of 
‘the disinherited of the earth’. Women’s Liberationists of the 1960s and 70s, 
caught up in a complex feud with western liberal-democratic traditions, praised 
her personal unorthodoxy while criticising her, mistakenly, as a bourgeois 
liberal. The personae were as diverse as the political agendas prompting them, 
yet with one feature in common: an imaginary modernity.189 
 
In referring to ‘imaginary modernity’, Taylor means that all these historically contextual 
views of Wollstonecraft position her as embodying contemporary ideological concerns. 
Wollstonecraft is always situated within both scholarship and popular understanding as 
being ‘relevant’, and is therefore measured against the standards of present times rather 
than those of the eighteenth century. While recognising that no analysis, including her 
own (or, indeed, my own), can escape from this tendency, Taylor affirms that 
Wollstonecraft and her arguments should be understood and evaluated in relation to the 
full context of the time in which she lived.190 While this may seem a straightforwardly 
logical proposition, Taylor follows E.P. Thompson in asserting that once Wollstonecraft 
is judged against this historical context, the radicalism of her political profile as a 
‘Jacobin philosophe’ becomes apparent.191 In order to appreciate the innovative and 
progressive quality of Wollstonecraft’s thought, her writings must be properly situated 
within their historical context. 
 
 As an example of how Wollstonecraft has at times been inadequately 
historicised, Rosemarie Tong’s 1989 Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction 
is instructive. Here, each chapter is devoted to a different ‘school’ of feminism: liberal, 
Marxist, radical, socialist, psychoanalytic, existentialist and postmodern. Wollstonecraft 
is briefly referenced in the first chapter as a protagonist within the historical 
development of liberal feminist thought. In a section three and a half pages long entitled 
‘Liberal Feminism in the Eighteenth Century: The Same Education for Women as for 
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Men’, Tong positions Wollstonecraft as a classical liberal concerned solely with legal 
equality in education, rather than with political rights.192 She states that Wollstonecraft 
‘celebrated reason, usually at the expense of emotion’ and that it ‘did not occur to 
Wollstonecraft to question the value of traditional male traits’.193 Even in praising her, 
Tong situates Wollstonecraft’s feminism as being narrow and inadequate. 
Despite the limitations of her analysis, Wollstonecraft did present a vision of a 
woman, strong in mind and body, who is not a slave to her passions, her 
husband, or her children. For Wollstonecraft, the ideal woman is less interested 
in fulfilling herself – if by self-fulfillment is meant any sort of pandering to 
duty-distracting desires – than in exercising self-control. In order to liberate 
herself from the oppressive roles of emotional cripple, petty shrew, and 
narcissistic sex object, a woman must, Wollstonecraft believed, obey the 
commands of reason and discharge her wifely and motherly duties faithfully.194 
 
There is a degree of truth contained in Tong’s representation of Wollstonecraft’s 
thought, particularly in relation to A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, as I will show. 
However, in framing Wollstonecraft simply as a middle-class liberal concerned only 
with educational equality in order to better equip women for their traditional duties in 
the private sphere, Tong fails to recognise the radicalism of her politics within its 
historical context. To separate ‘liberal feminism’ from ‘radical feminism’ in the context 
of the late eighteenth century is obviously ahistorical. It is misleading to assert that 
Wollstonecraft simply takes male norms as human norms. This is because her radical 
enlightenment philosophy entails a re-specification of human nature in general. 
 
 Wollstonecraft, as Taylor argues, must be understood as a protagonist of the 
radical Enlightenment of the 1790s. She was part of the circle of reformist writers and 
commentators gathered around the publisher Joseph Johnson including, among others, 
Joseph Priestly, the Reverend Richard Price, Thomas Paine and William Godwin all of 
whom (initially) supported the French Revolution of 1789 and saw it as the prelude to 
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further progress in the advancement of human liberty and perfectibility. Wollstonecraft 
was not the only woman in this London-based literary circle with other notable names 
being Mary Hays, Maria Edgeworth and Anna Barbauld.195 This group of writers and 
thinkers was part of the radical wing within the ‘broad church’ of the English 
enlightened tradition that would fracture after 1789, with the result that, in later years, it 
would be more difficult to speak of a British, particularly an English, Enlightenment.196 
 
 Writing in his deliberately revisionist work of popular history Enlightenment: 
Britain and the Creation of the Modern World, Roy Porter shows how, during the 
increasingly reactionary climate of the 1790s, the dominant image of the British 
philosopher shifted from being that of a patriot who was continuing in the proud native 
tradition of John Locke and the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 to being that of a 
dangerous subversive who had been infected by innately foreign French ideas. Within 
this context, there was a political imperative to positioning the ‘Enlightenment’ as being 
antithetical to British tradition. Porter demonstrates how rapidly and profoundly this 
shift in the political and social atmosphere occurred by describing a gathering held at a 
Norwich tavern on the First of November 1788 to celebrate the centenary of the so-
called Glorious Revolution. He writes: 
Over a hundred gentlemen had supped at the city centre tavern with a Dissenter 
in the chair. ‘The immortal memory of King William’ produced three cheers … 
There were more radical toasts too: ‘the majesty of the People’ and ‘freedom to 
slaves’. Nearer home, the diners had a whipround for the miserable debtors 
languishing in the city’s gaols. The event captures the true flavour of the English 
Enlightenment, progressive but not incendiary, broad church and confident 
enough to include toasts to prelates and people alike, to embrace Anglicans and 
Dissenters, and to extend sympathy to unfortunates. Such relaxed, tolerant 
optimism did not long survive the outbreak of the French Revolution.197 
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The increasing radicalism and violence of events in France, and debate over their 
meaning, would cause a divide with many erstwhile liberal Whigs siding with the 
conservative establishment against the more radical advocates of political and social 
change within Britain. The interpretation of the events of 1688 would become a subject 
of contention. Porter positions Richard Price and Edmund Burke as representing, in 
their respective public speeches and writings, diametrically opposed readings of the 
Glorious Revolution, its legacy and its relationship to contemporary events in France. 
While Price saw the events of 1688 as representing a period of revolutionary 
progressive change in relation to which both the American and French Revolutions 
were logical and necessary progressions that signalled the need for further reform in 
Britain, Burke framed the events and legacy of the Glorious Revolution in conservative 
and constitutionalist terms.198 Burke mounted these arguments in his Reflections on the 
Revolution in France.199 
 
 Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Men, written and published in 
1790, was framed as a public reply to Burke. Hers was not the only written rebuttal of 
Burke to come from the reformist side, with Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man long 
being the most well known. However, Wollstonecraft’s intervention meant that she had 
shifted from socially acceptable genres of female authorship such as novels and advice 
books to the far more contentious area of political debate in the public sphere. Taylor 
states that from ‘the moment Wollstonecraft published The Rights of Men her status 
shifted from literary lady to radical philosophe’.200 The only other noted female author 
in Britain during the late eighteenth century to write on the ‘masculine’ subjects of 
politics and history before the ascent of Wollstonecraft was the Whig historian 
Catherine Macaulay. Her death in 1791 prevented any meeting between the two women, 
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who were publicly admiring of each other’s work.201 A Vindication of the Rights of Men 
should be understood not only as a precursor to A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
(there appears to be no explanation for Wollstonecraft’s inconsistency regarding the use 
of the plural and singular noun) but also as a strong affirmation of radical enlightenment 
beliefs. 
 
 Arguing directly against Burke’s appeals to tradition, custom and ‘chivalry’, 
Wollstonecraft affirms the value of reason and natural rights. In contrast to Burke’s 
pessimism about human nature, Wollstonecraft sets forth a belief in human 
perfectibility and rationality, which she positions as being innate and derived from a 
divine creator. She states: 
It is necessary emphatically to repeat, that there are rights which men inherit at 
their birth, as rational creatures, who were raised above the brute creation by 
their improvable faculties; and that, in receiving these, not from their forefathers 
but, from God, prescription can never undermine natural rights.202 
 
The references to ‘forefathers’ and ‘prescription’ are a criticism of Burke and his 
continual appeals in the Reflections to social custom. Like many enlightened thinkers, 
Wollstonecraft positions natural rights as being derived from God. This is not simply a 
rhetorical device to maintain social respectability but, in all likelihood, a sincere belief 
on her part. Wollstonecraft’s religious beliefs, as with many British radicals of the time, 
were based on a variant of Non-Conformist Protestantism known as ‘Rational Dissent’. 
Taylor argues that there is an intrinsic link between Wollstonecraft’s radically 
enlightened belief in human reason and perfectibility and the religious creed to which 
she subscribed. Taylor describes the combination of influences that underpinned this 
religious system as being ‘a bracing brew of Lockean psychology, Newtonian 
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cosmology, rationalist morality and reform politics’.203 Rational Dissenters also rejected 
belief in the Trinity (hence their other designation as Unitarians) and the concepts of 
hell and original sin.204 It was a belief system that embodied the enlightened concept of 
‘rational religion’. It was also a belief system predicated on strong notions of social 
justice and responsibility. For Wollstonecraft, her faith in God, her belief in human 
reason, and her avowal of justice and republican virtue for both men and women are all 
interconnected. 
 
Wollstonecraft, Olympe de Gouges and the Pursuit of Virtue 
While A Vindication of the Rights of Men was addressed to Edmund Burke, A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, written and published two years later, was prefaced 
with a dedication addressed to Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, a leading figure 
in the French national assembly. Talleyrand had made speeches to the Assembly 
explicitly rejecting proposals that French women be granted the same political rights as 
male citizens.205 Wollstonecraft’s stated intention in dedicating the Vindication to 
Talleyrand was, as she addressed him, to ‘induce you to reconsider the subject, and 
maturely weigh what I have advanced respecting the rights of women and national 
education’. She goes on to state: ‘I plead for my sex – not for myself’.206 Women 
radicals who supported the revolutionary process in France had to negotiate the 
gendered ideals advanced by the leaders and ideologists of that process. When 
Wollstonecraft addressed Burke in her earlier Vindication, she was not seeking his 
endorsement or approval. Conversely, in dedicating the Rights of Woman to Talleyrand, 
she is publicly honouring a Revolutionary leader and endorsing the Revolution while 
directly challenging his stated views on the position of women within that Revolution. 
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The respectful dedication is a strategy used by Wollstonecraft to legitimate challenge 
and negotiation in relation to a political project of which she approves but seeks to 
reform. 
 
The discourse on women and their rightful status as debated by radicals in 
France and Britain during the period of the French Revolution was conflicted. The view 
of women commonly held by such radicals was often not any more ‘progressive’ than 
that advanced by established opinion. Because political radicalism in the late eighteenth 
century was to a large extent based around ideologies of classical republicanism and 
civic virtue, the ideal public sphere as envisaged by such radicals was one from which 
women were excluded. This tendency was exemplified by the theory of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau whose writings on education and child rearing strongly influenced the 
policies of the revolutionary government in France. 
 
 In this context, both Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges are in their writings 
testing the possibilities, as well as the limits, of enlightened radicalism in relation to 
gender and inclusive citizenship. In arguing that the rights of ‘man’ in their universal 
sense must include the rights of women in their specific sense, both Wollstonecraft and 
de Gouges negotiate with the meaning of concepts of reason and virtue, rather than 
simply embracing or rejecting them. They both employ strategies of legitimation in 
publicly endorsing (or seeking the endorsement of) male authors and public figures 
whom they in some cases then challenge. Both women use the teachings of Rousseau 
while also criticising or revising his conception of gender. 
 
 Pre-dating modern feminist criticism of Rousseau, female readers and authors 
engaged with the complexity and contradictions of his ideas concerning women during 
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his own time. In Sexual Politics in the Enlightenment: Women Writers Read Rousseau, 
Mary Seidman Trouille examines how seven eighteenth-century women responded to 
his ideas, both in the public sphere of authorship and in the private sphere of personal 
letters and diaries. Using the examples of Madame Roland, Madame d’Épinay, 
Germaine de Staël, Stephanie de Genlis, Wollstonecraft, de Gouges and the enigmatic 
‘Henriette’, Trouille shows how women from a diverse range of social backgrounds and 
with differing philosophical beliefs were engaged readers of Rousseau who both 
approved of and criticised his theories, sometimes simultaneously. Admiration for 
Rousseau’s theories of education or his egalitarian politics could be combined with 
arguments against his conception of women and their appropriate social roles. As 
Trouille argues, it was often the increasing realisation that Rousseau’s democratic and 
egalitarian philosophy was incompatible with his ideal of the feminine that caused 
female intellectual admirers to become either critics or revisionists. 
With the passing of time, these seven women came to view Rousseau’s ideal of 
sensibility and his limited view of female destiny with increasing ambivalence. 
With the insights brought to them by their careers as writers and their 
experiences as women, they gradually moved from a position of admirer or even 
passionate disciple of Rousseau to one of resisting reader and protesting writer. 
This was especially true of Wollstonecraft, d’Épinay, Staël, and Genlis, who 
were openly critical of Rousseau’s views on women and women writers by the 
end of their careers.207 
 
Within Trouille’s narrative, the female writers who engage in the most recognisably 
feminist criticisms of Rousseau are foregrounded over those who employ more subtle 
strategies of resistant or revisionist reading. As will be discussed below, Trouille 
compares de Gouges’s public admiration of Rousseau unfavourably with 
Wollstonecraft’s more direct critique expressed in the Vindication. This critique is 
based on a re-visioning of the concept of female virtue. Nevertheless, both 
Wollstonecraft and de Gouges seek to extend the ideal of republican virtue, and thus the 
rights of citizenship, to women. 
                                                
207 Mary Seidman Trouille, Sexual Politics in the Enlightenment: Women Writers read Rousseau, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997, p. 316. 
 80 
 
 A Vindication of the Rights of Woman encapsulates an understanding of the 
‘long’ Enlightenment from Locke through to Rousseau. Wollstonecraft is, in many 
respects, a Lockean rationalist but she also expresses qualified agreement with some of 
the ideas of Rousseau, the proto-romanticist. As with Rousseau himself, 
Wollstonecraft’s intellectual profile and body of work embodies the transition from the 
historical ‘Enlightenment’ toward the Romantic era. This is not to state that 
Wollstonecraft was actually a ‘romantic’ writer. As Taylor argues, the writings of 
Wollstonecraft defy any simple binary separation between enlightened intellect and 
romantic imagination.208 A Vindication of the Rights of Woman stands not only as an 
assertion of rights but also as one of the most trenchant critiques of Rousseau written 
from a pro-enlightenment perspective during the eighteenth century. 
 
In valorising the writings of Rousseau while also arguing against him, 
Wollstonecraft brings to light what she describes in the Vindication as his ‘unintelligible 
paradoxes’.209 She argues with Rousseau against Rousseau, particularly in relation to 
the differences in his attitudes toward how boys and girls should be educated. While 
agreeing with some of the concepts for childhood education that Rousseau puts forward 
in Emile, Wollstonecraft firmly objects to his differing views on the appropriate 
education and position of girls and women, as expressed through the character of 
Sophie. In arguing against Sophie as Rousseau’s ideal construct of womanhood, 
Wollstonecraft positions herself as an advocate of true reason and virtue against the 
excessive ‘sensibility’ of Rousseau. 
But, according to the tenour of reasoning, by which women are kept from the 
tree of knowledge, the important years of youth, the usefulness of age, and the 
rational hopes of futurity, are all to be sacrificed to render women an object of 
desire for a short time. Besides, how could Rousseau expect them to be virtuous 
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and constant when reason is neither allowed to be the foundation of their virtue, 
nor truth the object of their inquiries? But all of Rousseau’s errors in reasoning 
arose from sensibility, and sensibility to their charms women are very ready to 
forgive!210 
 
She goes on to state that ‘when he [Rousseau] should have reasoned he became 
impassioned, and reflection inflamed his imagination instead of enlightening his 
understanding’.211 Wollstonecraft positions herself as a defender of the ‘enlightening’ 
power of ‘reason’, and the ability to reason, against the misuse of ‘sensibility’ and 
‘imagination’ that underpins Rousseau’s restrictive ideal of the feminine as embodied 
by Sophie. In so doing, Wollstonecraft is inverting the gendered binary common to late 
eighteenth century enlightened thinking. She is linking herself, the woman, with the 
defence of reason while linking Rousseau, the man, with an excess of sensibility. As 
with the critique of Burke in the first Vindication, she assumes the role of the rationalist 
against the romantic. Most importantly, in making such an inversion of the binary, 
Wollstonecraft positions the use of reason as a means by which women can defend their 
intellectual and moral autonomy from the encroachment of potentially enslaving 
romantic fantasies or conceptions of what they should be. 
 
 In arguing against Rousseau’s ideas on how girls should be educated, 
Wollstonecraft makes use of the ideas of John Locke in relation to both the raising of 
children and human epistemology. She refutes Rousseau’s assertion that girls have an 
innate disposition toward ornate clothing by evoking Locke’s statements in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education against restrictive clothing and a ‘sedentary life’ for 
children.212 In attacking the ‘false system of female manners’ on which the education of 
girls is predicated, Wollstonecraft uses Locke in stating that the ‘power of generalizing 
ideas, of drawing comprehensive conclusions from individual observations, is the only 
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acquirement for an immortal being, that really deserves the name of knowledge’.213 
Wollstonecraft’s use of Locke demonstrates not only his pivotal influence over the 
course of the British Enlightenment but also her belief in a genderless mind. It can be 
asserted that Locke was a considerably more ‘gender-neutral’ writer than Rousseau and 
that Locke’s epistemology was conducive to Wollstonecraft’s view of human nature. As 
she asserts in the Vindication, ‘for men and women, truth, if I understand the meaning 
of the word, must be the same’.214 She argues that the meaning of ‘virtue’ must 
therefore be applied equally to men and women, as opposed to only denoting restrictive 
codes of sexual behaviour in the case of the latter.215 Wollstonecraft’s efforts at re-
framing the concept of ‘virtue’ are intricately linked to her envisioning of female 
citizenship. 
 
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is most commonly positioned as being 
more concerned with questions of female education and intellectual potential than with 
matters of civil equality. However, by re-framing the concept of ‘virtue’, Wollstonecraft 
is pointing toward a model of equal female citizenship. Within this framework, women 
should no longer defer to the strictures of moral ‘virtue’ defined in exclusively sexual 
terms but instead aspire to civic virtue as rational members of society. Referring to 
women, Wollstonecraft states: 
To become respectable, the exercise of their understanding is necessary, there is 
no other foundation for independence of character; I mean explicitly to say that 
they must only bow to the authority of reason, instead of being the modest slaves 
of opinion.216 
 
According to Wollstonecraft, female virtue should be understood in terms of the woman 
citizen and her capacity for reason and not as a means of controlling and proscribing 
female sexuality. Wollstonecraft’s effort to ‘de-gender’ the concept of virtue has radical 
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implications, particularly within the context of eighteenth century European society. 
Her conception of virtue points to civil equality for women while also explicitly 
rejecting gendered double standards regarding sexual behaviour. Wollstonecraft 
positions a woman’s virtue as being based on reason and not on social constructions of 
sexual modesty. Such a definition of female ‘virtue’ was largely unacceptable to both 
conservatives and progressives alike during the time of the French Revolution. In 
France, the playwright and author Olympe de Gouges would confront the limits of 
socially acceptable female citizenship. 
 
There are a number of similarities between de Gouges and Wollstonecraft 
beyond the fact that they both wrote treatises on women’s rights. Both were from 
modest middle-class backgrounds (although de Gouges may have been the illegitimate 
daughter of an aristocrat) and both were autodidacts.217 While both were supporters of 
the Revolution, they had a shared sympathy for the more moderate (Girondist) elements 
within the national assembly. 
 
There are also significant differences between the two women. There was an 
obvious difference between being a sympathetic observer of the Revolution while living 
in England and being a protagonist within factional politics in France. Wollstonecraft 
did of course go to France in 1792 but there is little evidence that she and de Gouges 
met, or that they had the opportunity to read each other’s work. They also differ in their 
autodidactic careers, leading to significant differences in their written work. As stated 
above, Wollstonecraft was part of an informed literary circle, and demonstrated 
familiarity with the works and authors she cited. De Gouges, according to Janie Vanpée, 
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had ‘absolutely no literary formation’.218 Vanpée casts doubt on the extent to which de 
Gouges had actually engaged with the written works of Rousseau when she referenced 
his ideas in her 1788 essay Le Bonheur primitif de l’homme, ou les rêveries 
patriotiques.219 Vanpée situates de Gouges’s autodidactic accumulation of knowledge 
within the tumultuous public sphere of Paris during the late eighteenth century. 
Her knowledge was steeped in oral tradition, gleaned informally from hearing 
whatever ideas, words, commonplaces were being bandied about on stage, at the 
national assemblies, in street and salon discussions. In this sense, de Gouges was 
very much a product of her times, reflecting in both the content of her 
knowledge and the manner by which she gained that knowledge, the explosion 
of speech, discourse, and oral communication of all types that occurred at the 
advent of and during the Revolution.220 
 
Much of de Gouges’s writing is modelled on public speeches and declarations, rather 
than on books and essays. Both Wollstonecraft and de Gouges wrote fiction as a means 
of communicating their social concerns. However, Wollstonecraft wrote novels whereas 
de Gouges wrote plays, as will be discussed below. The public sphere that de Gouges 
inhabited is thus a more performative space than the literary circles inhabited by 
Wollstonecraft. The political space that de Gouges uses during the Revolutionary period 
is one that is based on patterns of public speech, public performance and public 
declaration. This is demonstrated in the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the 
Female Citizen published in 1791. 
 
Unlike Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, de Gouges’s Declaration is not a 
discursive essay but is instead directly based on the National Assembly’s 1789 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, with a Preamble followed by 
numbered articles. It concludes with a ‘Postamble’ that concisely refers to a number of 
subjects ranging from the status of women under the old regime, a proposal for civil 
unions referencing Rousseau’s ‘Social Contract’, a plea for the emancipation of ‘men of 
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colour’ in France’s Caribbean colonies and an anecdote concerning de Gouges’s 
experiences with a rude Paris coachman.221 Despite the seeming lack of discipline 
within this ‘Postamble’, it contains some of de Gouges’s most pointed observations. 
Comparing the status of women under the Ancien Régime to their position within the 
new revolutionary order, she asserts that women were ‘in former times despicable and 
respected, and since the Revolution respectable and despised’.222 De Gouges means 
that, under the old regime, certain women wielded social and political power indirectly 
as the wives and favourites of kings and ministers whereas, under the new order, 
women were venerated as mothers producing children for the ‘fatherland’ (‘La Patrie’) 
but excluded from political power. In stating this, she recognises the implications of the 
revolutionary government’s gendered discourse on ‘virtue’ and citizenship. 
 
Dorinda Outram, in her essay ‘Le Langage Mâle de la Vertu: Women and the 
Discourse of the French Revolution’, explores how the concept of ‘virtue’, in its 
classically republican sense, was central to the ideology of the Revolution and what this 
meant for conceptions of female citizenship. Outram describes how the Revolutionary 
government linked female political power with the corruption of the body politic. 
To a very large extent, the influence of women was seen as the defining 
characteristic of the corruption of power under the Old Regime. Boudoir 
politics, the exchange of political gifts for sexual favours, are seen both as 
causes of the weakness of the Old Regime, and as the justification of the 
Revolution. Perhaps the most telling example of this occurred during the trial of 
Marie Antoinette, the deposed Queen of France, in 1793.… To the degree that 
power in the Old Regime was ascribed to women, that meant that the discourse 
of the Revolution was committed to an anti-feminine rhetoric.223 
 
Virtuous politics in Revolutionary France was thus masculine politics. Outram goes on 
to note the highly gendered use of the term ‘virtue’ in Revolutionary discourse and 
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asserts that the ‘necessary conclusion was that political revolution could only take place 
if women were excluded from exercising power, and the niche formally occupied by 
women’s powerful vice was taken over by male virtue’.224 De Gouges’s Declaration is 
therefore a direct challenge to the gendered view of virtuous citizenship promulgated by 
the Revolutionary authorities. As with Wollstonecraft, de Gouges is arguing that 
women should be able to claim ‘virtue’ in its republican sense. 
 
 Such a challenge to this gendered concept of civic virtue is also implicitly a 
challenge to the teachings of Rousseau. However, de Gouges is consistent in her public 
admiration for Rousseau and his ideas. In contrast to Vanpée’s assertions, Trouille 
positions de Gouges as being an actual reader of Rousseau who demonstrates not just a 
general familiarity with his ideas but also specific knowledge of his writings.225 What 
can be asserted is that de Gouges demonstrated an understanding of his thought. Her 
admiration of Rousseau was not just a public exercise but a sincere belief evidenced in 
private letters. Trouille states that, while imprisoned, de Gouges ‘invoked Rousseau and 
identified with his persona of persecuted virtue’ in a letter to her son.226 De Gouges also 
strongly identified with Rousseau’s proto-romanticist conceptions of nature and natural 
talent in framing her own abilities as an author.227 This admiration of, and personal 
identification with, Rousseau did not prevent de Gouges from criticising his view of 
women and their proper social role. In a preface to one of her plays published in 1791, 
she makes reference to the ‘sternest of our learned men’ who, she writes, ‘grant us only 
the right to please’ and who ‘argue that we are fit only to run a household and that 
women with scholarly or literary pretensions are insufferable creatures’.228 However, 
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she does not refer to Rousseau by name. As Trouille recognises, this is a deliberate 
strategic exercise. 
By avoiding criticising Rousseau directly, Gouges … was able to challenge his 
views on women without having to disavow her enthusiasm for his egalitarian 
ideas or his important influence on her development as a thinker and writer.229 
 
Trouille later states that de Gouges ‘lacked the courage or the insight (or both) to 
criticise Rousseau directly’.230 This is perhaps an unfair assessment. As with 
Wollstonecraft’s appeal to Talleyrand, de Gouges is pursuing a strategy of legitimation. 
By publicly endorsing Rousseau, she is valorising a figure whose ideas are associated 
with the official ideology of the Revolutionary government and in particular the Jacobin 
faction. She is seeking to change the civic status of women while demonstrating her 
adherence to republican values. 
 
Olympe de Gouges shares the vision of Wollstonecraft in advocating for a 
genderless conception of civic virtue. As she famously states in article ten of her 
Declaration: ‘Woman has the right to mount the scaffold; she should equally have the 
right to mount the Tribune’.231 The irony of the fact that the authorities would 
eventually grant her the former has been frequently noted. Vanpée argues that de 
Gouges was tried and executed not so much for her specific political opinions as for the 
fact that she publicly professed them.232 Her arrest in 1793 was due to her writing and 
distributing a pamphlet that called for a plebiscite on the form of government to be 
adopted by Revolutionary France. De Gouges argued at her trial that these actions 
should be interpreted not as evidence of monarchist sympathies on her part, as the 
prosecution alleged, but as proof of her deeply held republican and democratic 
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convictions.233 Following her execution, a government newspaper admonished her for 
‘forgetting the virtues that suit her sex’.234 The gendered conception of the civic virtue 
to which she aspired would ultimately cost de Gouges her life. 
 
 The particular conception of civic virtue and classically republican values held 
by Olympe de Gouges is presented in many of her plays. In positioning de Gouges as a 
polemical author in the public sphere, many historians have focused on her short 
political tracts and pamphlets, such as the Declaration, while either ignoring or 
underestimating her work as a published playwright.235 However, it is in her capacity as 
a playwright that de Gouges’s positions on contentious subjects including slavery, 
divorce, the social status of women and the direction of the Revolution were all 
communicated to audiences and met with an often hostile critical reception. When 
considering her impact as an author in the public sphere, de Gouges’s status as a 
playwright must be recognised. In relation to arguments amongst scholars concerning 
the extent of her literary formation, the fact that de Gouges wrote plays which were 
published and performed is an integral part of her contentious profile as a woman in the 
‘republic of letters’. Gabrielle Verdier argues that the continued marginalisation of the 
plays of de Gouges by contemporary historians is partly due to the low aesthetic regard 
in which ‘revolutionary theater and eighteenth-century bourgeois drama’ are held.236 
Verdier focuses on the ways in which de Gouges both adheres to and challenges the 
narrative conventions of such theatre while writing plays with a political and social 
purpose. 
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Olympe de Gouges’s vocation as an author and playwright pre-dates the 
Revolution of 1789. However, it was during the Revolutionary period of the 1790s that 
some of her plays could actually be performed. Of her twelve plays written between 
1783 and 1793 that survive, ten were published and four were performed.237 Her 
authorship is easy to attribute because, rather than write and publish using a male 
pseudonym, she signed all her work with her own name in defiance of contemporary 
convention.238 While her most expressly political plays were written during the 
Revolutionary period, the plays she wrote before 1789 also address social concerns. 
Written as early as 1783, the drama Zamor et Mirza, ou l’heureux naufage is a critique 
of slavery in the French West-Indies. Its controversial subject caused its staging to be 
delayed by the Comédie Française until 1789, following the initial stages of the 
Revolution and the threat of legal action by de Gouges.239 During the 1790s it was 
retitled as L’Esclavage des negres, by which it is more widely known.240 Some of the 
plays written by de Gouges to address the status of women also pre-date the Revolution. 
Written in 1787, the comedy Le Philosophe corrigé ou le Cocu supposé criticises 
gendered double standards regarding sexual virtue.241 The question of what constituted 
female virtue after the Revolution is central to de Gouges’s later plays. 
 
 One of the last plays to be written by de Gouges before her arrest and eventual 
execution was L’entrée de Dumourier à Bruxelles ou les Vivandiers. It serves as a 
demonstration of how de Gouges used her plays to affirm her support for the Revolution 
while also seeking to radically alter the position of women within it. As with many 
plays written in France during the 1790s, it serves as a propaganda piece intended to 
glorify a contemporary figure. This had unfortunate consequences for de Gouges 
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because the figure used in the play, the war hero General Dumouriez, suffered defeat 
and then defected to the Austrians within a few weeks of the play first being performed 
early in 1793.242 However, the narrative focus of the play is not on Dumouriez (or 
‘Dumourier’ as the title of the play refers to him) but on the common people who serve 
in his army, including the play’s female protagonists. De Gouges’s final play has many 
of the tropes which characterise her body of work as a playwright and serve to 
distinguish it from her contemporaries. Verdier offers the following description of the 
features which mark de Gouges’s comedies and dramas. 
The young woman plays a more active role and attempts to fashion her own 
destiny. Female rivalry is virtually nonexistent. Mature women, quite numerous, 
serve as protectresses and role models for the younger ones, and encourage their 
emancipation. Moreover, the young woman’s fate and the obstacle she faces – 
abusive domestic authority or institutions – are linked to another social injustice 
denounced by the play. Rather than the sacrifice of a solitary victim, the play 
stages the solidarity of oppressed groups against the masters and the oppressive 
institutions. Indeed, de Gouges’s casts include crowds of common people, 
slaves, peasants, nuns, simple soldiers, and guards won over by their destitute 
prisoners.243 
 
All of these features are present in Dumourier. However, unlike in de Gouges’s earlier 
plays, the central male authority figure is valorised rather than resisted. De Gouges is 
once again pursuing a strategy of legitimation for her radical arguments by endorsing a 
male figure of authority known in the public sphere. As a piece of Revolutionary 
propaganda, the play endorses the figure of General Dumouriez and the institution of 
the Revolutionary army. It endorses, to an extent, the official ideology of the French 
Revolutionary government (as nebulous and unstable as that was). The heterodox 
element is the representation of the female characters and how they are used to 
promulgate de Gouges’s differing conception of republican civic virtue and equality. 
 
 The female characters in Dumourier transgress accepted roles for women, in the 
sense of both representation on stage and in serving as models for behaviour in the 
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public sphere. While other plays of the period feature women as combatants in the 
Revolutionary army, reflecting a reality during 1792-93 before the National Assembly 
passed a law which strictly limited the role of women to that of nurses and camp-
followers, in de Gouges’s play the female soldiers are not ‘curiosities’ but instead serve 
as ‘models for women’.244 While it may seem incongruous that de Gouges would 
valorise the concept of women as soldiers given the essentially pacifist nature of her 
philosophy, it is in fact consistent as her Declaration of the Rights of Woman and the 
Female Citizen is based on the assertion that women have equal rights to men in the 
public sphere and can practise civic virtue. Valorising the idea of a citizens’ army is 
also consistent with classical republicanism.  
 
Dumourier can be understood as an attempt by de Gouges to combine an 
endorsement of the classically republican ideology sanctioned by the Revolutionary 
authorities with an affirmation that such a conception of civic virtue be inclusive of 
women. As Verdier states: 
De Gouges did warn that the success of the Revolution depended on the 
regeneration of civic virtue, but did not equate this with narrow moralism. She 
proclaimed, moreover, that this regeneration could only be achieved by the 
active participation of women in the political sphere, not their exclusion.245 
 
It was this radical conception of female citizenship, combined with the growing 
disrepute attached to the figure of General Dumouriez, which led to the play being 
received with an almost uniformly hostile critical reception when published and 
performed.246 While de Gouges was not tried and executed for the plays that she wrote, 
her work as a playwright contributed to her increasingly negative reputation in the 
public sphere of the Revolution. Her body of work, both as a playwright and as a 
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political author, is consistent in demanding that the same standard of civic virtue be 
applied equally to male and female citizens of the new republic. 
 
 Olympe de Gouges and Mary Wollstonecraft were both advocates of reason and 
enlightenment. They both argued for enlightened concepts of ‘reason’ and ‘rights’ to be 
applied to all people regardless of gender. As with many radicals of the Revolutionary 
era, they both had strong sympathies with the classically republican idea of ‘virtue’ and 
sought to remove its gendered connotations while affirming their belief in equal 
citizenship. To this end, each affirmed their own position as female authors in the public 
sphere. They both recognised the contradictions of enlightened discourse while 
remaining committed to the principles of the Enlightenment. They both negotiated these 
contradictions through the pursuit of strategies of legitimation that enabled them to 
challenge the conception of gender held by many radicals of the time while positioning 
themselves as supporters of radical change. The extent to which their arguments are 
applicable to contemporary feminist thought will be addressed in the final section of the 
next chapter. 
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Chapter Five 
The ‘Enlightenment’ and the Democratic Public Sphere 
 
In Chapters Three and Four, I have sought to demonstrate what the historical European 
‘Enlightenment’ was and how questions of progressive social change and social justice 
for the marginalised and oppressed were addressed at that time, by authors who 
themselves hailed from such conditions. In so doing, I have offered an alternative 
picture of the Enlightenment to the dominant view within cultural studies as outlined in 
Chapter One. I have also shown, in Chapter Two, how theorists as diverse as Habermas, 
Foucault and Derrida share an ultimately affirmative view of what ‘Enlightenment’ is 
and support the need for a self-aware and progressive conception of cultural modernity. 
This final chapter is therefore centred on the following central question: how can 
cultural studies use the legacy of the Enlightenment in its development of progressive 
social theory? There is a historically specific corollary to this question. How might the 
ideas put forward by Moses Mendelssohn, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Olympe de 
Gouges contribute towards contemporary debates on multicultural and feminist theory 
respectively? There is also a broader corollary to this question. How can cultural studies 
re-position a certain kind of modernity as necessary without re-inscribing an oppressive 
affirmation of a socially destructive mode of modernity? 
 
To ask the central question is to return to the theory of Jürgen Habermas. His 
writings and lectures concerning how an inclusive polity is constructed in relation to 
communicative action, deliberative democracy and the role of religion within the 
framework of a secular constitutional state are of central importance to the question of 
how contemporary cultural theory, including cultural studies, can continue the 
‘unfinished project’ of the Enlightenment in advancing a socially just conception of 
modernity. It is not my intention to merely agree with every argument and theoretical 
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model advanced by Habermas. Instead I hope to demonstrate how his continuingly 
evolving body of work can make a valuable contribution to how concepts of pluralism, 
multiculturalism, democracy and the public sphere are theorised within cultural studies. 
Habermas’s theories have at times been criticised within the field. This has sometimes 
been due to misinterpretation and a failure to acknowledge that his theoretical positions 
are not static.  
 
In the first section of this chapter I position Habermas’s arguments concerning 
constitutional democracy and an inclusive public sphere in relation to how such themes 
are expounded within cultural studies. I do this via an extended comparative reading of 
cultural theorist David Morley and his year 2000 text Home Territories and the work of 
Habermas. In the next section of this chapter, I probe Habermas’s developing arguments 
concerning the role of religion and cultural difference in the formation of an inclusive 
constitutional state. While these arguments are rooted in Kantian idealism, I will show 
how such ideas do, in fact, link back to the work of Mendelssohn. In the final section of 
this chapter I explore Nancy Fraser’s theoretical engagement with Habermas’s work and 
posit the continuing relevance of Wollstonecraft and de Gouges to a feminist 
theorisation of an inclusive public sphere. Models of engaged citizenship and an 
inclusive public sphere within the framework of a constitutional polity are the link 
between the work of Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges and their continued 
relevance to contemporary cultural theory. 
 
Habermas, Cultural Studies and the Theorising of the Public Sphere 
How a genuinely inclusive and democratic public sphere can be developed is a shared 
theoretical concern for both Habermas and some cultural studies practitioners. This 
section activates a critical engagement with David Morley’s Home Territories: Media, 
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Mobility and Identity. Owing to its time of publication, the discussion of media systems 
in Morley’s book is now dated by its focus on print and television. However, it serves as 
an instructive example of how the concept of the public sphere, including Habermas’s 
theorisation of it, is typically framed within cultural studies. In analysing Morley’s 
arguments about the public sphere and the possibilities for multicultural and post-
national social formations, I engage in a comparative intertextual reading with the work 
of Habermas. 
 
The continuing importance of Habermas as a seminal theorist of the public 
sphere, who has long explored the nature of democratic citizenship and the tensions 
between the often opposing discourses of civil society and nationalism, is 
acknowledged within cultural studies but he is at times subject to misinterpretation. 
Morley makes some assertions about Habermas’s arguments that are misleading. His 
assessment of Habermas’s work should not go unanswered. Any analysis of the links 
between territoriality, citizenship, and the construction of a public sphere cannot lightly 
dismiss the contributions made by Habermas towards the theoretical understanding of 
these concepts. Through engaging in an intertextual reading of Morley and Habermas, I 
probe the extent to which a discourse of active and participatory citizenship can 
transcend mechanisms of social and territorial exclusion. 
 
 In Home Territories, Morley investigates the nature of territoriality by 
considering how ideologies of ‘home’ are mobilised by various groups in reference to 
constructions of identity. He states in the introduction that despite the discourse of post-
modernity making much of a ‘de-territorialised’ existence based on increased 
mobilities, the ‘concept of home often remains as the uninterrogated anchor or alter-ego 
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of all this hyper-mobility’.247 Therefore, Morley seeks to investigate the links between 
how people identify with home as an actual site and the wider questions of place and 
identity. By using a methodology of ‘postmodern geography’, he analyses how 
territorial discourses operate at both the micro level of the individual home and local 
community and the macro level of the nation-state, and the connections between the 
two.248 He thus intends to show the symbiotic relationship between how a normalised 
xenophobia informs constructions of homeliness and how the trope of the home features 
in the exclusional discourse of the nation-state. He writes: 
In particular, my focus is on the process through which, in different contexts, 
conflict is generated in the process of identity formation by the attempt to expel 
alterity beyond the boundaries of some ethnically, culturally or civilisationally 
purified homogenous enclave, at whatever level of social or geographical scale. 
In these processes, the crucial issue in defining who (or what) ‘belongs’ is … 
also that of defining who (or what) is to be excluded as ‘matter out of place’, 
whether that matter is represented by impure or foreign material objects, persons 
or cultural products.249 
 
The processes of exclusion that operate both in the private sphere of the home and the 
public sphere of the nation state are sourced from the same discourse. Morley argues 
that a hegemonic understanding of these spheres is configured through the media.250 He 
positions communications technology as the nexus between the two spheres and asserts 
the paradoxical nature of its role as a transgressor of the public/private boundary which 
invades the home while at the same time affirming the value of the normative household 
and shared experience within the context of the nation state.251 Media and 
communication technologies, in occupying both spheres, assist in the articulation of 
who is addressed and included and who is excluded from the imagined community of 
the nation. 
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 Morley frames the mediated construction of this imagined community as a 
question of who is granted ‘symbolic membership of the nation’ and what modes are 
available for participation in the community as it is imagined through the media.252 Who 
is addressed and included through broadcasting denotes the limits of the public sphere. 
However, Morley is very much aware that there has been much work in the disciplines 
of media and cultural studies over the years which positions national media 
broadcasting as a site of normalising ideology. He re-iterates the argument that analysis 
of the role of the media must transcend a model of purely vertical power relations and 
instead incorporate understandings of both vertical and horizontal relations in how 
media broadcasting communicates with the public(s).253 In relation to the complexity of 
who is being hailed and how, he mobilises arguments against the concept of there being 
a singular public sphere that must be valorised above other forms of social organisation. 
 
 It is within this context that Morley enters into a critique of what he interprets as 
Habermas’s conception of the public sphere and its development. Mobilising the 
arguments of other theorists, he frames Habermas’s analysis of the public sphere as an 
outdated discourse that privileges normative and elitist conceptions of active citizenship 
and democracy at the expense of other groups and modes. It should be noted that 
Morley does not actually reference any primary sources by Habermas himself but only 
other theorists’ critiques. He also does not identify the text or body of work to which he 
is referring but instead summarises Habermas’s theoretical position on the public sphere 
as follows: 
The basic narrative of Habermas’ work on the public sphere can be argued to 
represent a ‘tragic rise and fall myth’ in which that sphere is seen to have arisen 
in reaction to the limits of an old aristocratic culture but then to have been 
corrupted by the artificialities of our contemporary mediatised world.254 
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The unnamed work which is being referred to is The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society which, although not 
published in English until 1989, was first published in German in 1962.255 The 
significance of this time delay in translation becomes apparent when considering the 
nature of some of the mobilised criticisms of this work. Without having situated this 
uncited work in any historical context or even identified its title, Morley then proceeds 
to singularly validate another theorist’s critique. He writes: 
Nancy Fraser rightly argues that not only does Habermas’ account idealise 
the liberal public sphere, but because he fails to examine other non-liberal, 
non-bourgeois, competing public sphere – what she calls subaltern counter-
publics – that he ends up idealising the uninterrogated class- and gender-
based assumptions of the claim that the bourgeois public ever fully 
represented the public in the first place.256 
 
As we will see, Habermas never made such a claim, and the concept of ‘counter-
publics’ was something he initiated. While it is ahistorical to criticise a text published in 
1962 for ‘uninterrogated’ gender-based assumptions without identifying its context, the 
problem is compounded by a failure to assess the actual text in question. I re-iterate that 
my intention is not to engage in an uncritical defence of Habermas, but rather to 
demonstrate the continuing relevance of his theories to conceptions of the public sphere, 
democracy, and territoriality. It is therefore imperative that any assessment of 
Habermas’s still developing body of work be properly situated within the relevant 
contexts. In his original introduction, Habermas does foreground that he is specifically 
investigating the development of the bourgeois public sphere, as opposed to ‘plebeian’ 
ones.257 As William Outhwaite notes, while Habermas did not entirely ignore questions 
of class and gender in the original edition, he does address these criticisms in his 
introduction to the second German edition.258 Habermas, whatever the confusion over 
his self-identification as a Marxist theoretician, has been consistent in addressing 
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questions of power and oppression throughout his writings.259 Nancy Fraser 
acknowledges this, as will be explored in the final section of this chapter. 
 
 The largest gap in theoretical understanding between the Habermas and the 
Morley texts separated by almost forty years is in how the relationship between the 
media and its audiences is conceived. As stated above, Morley rejects the model of a 
solely vertical power relationship between dominating media systems and passive 
audience, affirming the contemporary dominant discourse within the disciplines of 
media studies and cultural studies that stresses the agency of the consumer. In 
comparison, The Structural Transformation, as a relatively seminal inquiry into the role 
of media systems in the public sphere, has a more alarmist and conspiratorial tone. 
Here, Habermas constructs a clear differentiation between the function of the media in 
the bourgeois public sphere of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe and the ‘mass 
media’ of the postwar period. He argues that the former served as a discursive space for 
relatively open mutual discussion of ideas and issues within the bourgeois sphere, often 
in opposition to the ruling establishment as embodied by royalty and aristocracy, 
whereas the latter is a corporatised organ of state and commercial power that constructs, 
rather than transmits public opinion. He writes: 
According to the liberal model of the public sphere, the institutions of the public 
engaged in rational-critical debate were protected from interference by public 
authority by virtue of their being in the hands of private people. To the extent 
that they were commercialised and underwent economic, technological, and 
organisational concentration, however, they have turned during the last hundred 
years into complexes of societal power, so that precisely their remaining in 
private hands in many ways threatened the critical functions of publicist 
institutions.260 
 
While this line of argument may feature an overly idealised construction of the 
Enlightenment public sphere, the characterisation of the development of media systems 
into corporate entities and the subsequent effect of that on open and informed 
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discussion within the contemporary public sphere can be considered prescient over fifty 
years later. As Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts (writing in the introduction to 
their 2004 edited work, After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere) assert, 
the arguments contained in Structural Transformation ‘are as relevant as they ever 
were’ in the context of the contemporary growing awareness of the problematic nature 
of corporate power and the development of social justice movements around the ‘anti-
corporate’ discourse.261 The relevance of such arguments can therefore be extended to 
contemporary social movements including the more recent ‘Occupy’ protests. 
 
While Structural Transformation does frame the mass media as a somewhat 
monolithic entity that has a dominating effect on public opinion, disregarding people’s 
agency, this is once again a matter of the context in which it was written. While an 
emphasis on the structural power of media systems may have been the dominant 
discourse in sociological theory in the 1960s, Habermas has since expressed awareness 
that the model of vertical power relations between media and audience is no longer 
viable.262 Therefore, the apparent disregard for the agency of the viewer shown in 
Structural Transformation is a matter of time and context rather than of ideology. 
 
 The discourse of readership agency, as validated by Morley, also has 
problematic implications for the construction of a model of active citizenship and a 
critical public sphere. In criticising the limits of the ‘masculinist’ public sphere and 
valorising a more positive conception of media readership, Morley mobilises arguments 
that frame the mass media and popular culture as sites of empowerment for subaltern 
groups that have been traditionally excluded from the main sites of public discourse.263 
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A telling example is his paraphrasing of Lila Abu-Lughod’s argument that, in Egypt, 
television has allowed much wider access to knowledge and literacies about the outside 
world than the traditional public sphere as embodied by the Cairo coffee house, because 
such a space was limited to urban men.264 While this is most probably true, Morley’s 
assertion that television therefore ‘has had a profoundly democratising effect’, is 
troubling.265 Although the concept that disempowered groups can use popular or 
trivialised culture as a site of re-negotiation is an influential idea within cultural studies, 
there is nothing inherently democratic about sitting in front of a television or computer 
screen. However engaged a viewer one may be, in most circumstances the level of 
agency and control most people have over what they watch is limited to the ability to 
change channels or switch off. While cable and satellite television (or public 
broadcasting) may hail groups who feel excluded from the discourse of national 
belonging that the mainstream broadcasters project, television in itself cannot constitute 
a counter-public. The same criticism can be made in relation to inter-net based ‘social 
media’. Applications such as ‘Facebook’ increasingly function as sites of corporate and 
government surveillance over each individual consumer while ‘Twitter’ is, by its very 
nature, an inadequate and debased form of public discourse. Such criticism is not to 
deny the usefulness of these applications in helping to organise activism in public space. 
 
 The danger in validating the consumption of popular culture in the private 
sphere over the exclusionary limits of the public sphere is that the exclusion is 
perpetuated. Patterns of consumption do not in themselves constitute an emancipatory 
political project. Seeing members of marginalised social and ethnic groups on television 
can be considered a validating shift ‘towards a multi-ethnic public sphere’.266 But 
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conflating the inclusiveness of a society with its mediated forms does not advance the 
cause of social justice. Nonetheless, Morley asserts a valid political position: 
An egalitarian multicultural society depends on the creation and maintenance of 
a plurality of public arenas in which a wide range of groups, with a diverse 
range of values and rhetorics, can effectively participate.267 
 
However, the development of such democratic plurality entails an actively political 
engagement. The democratisation of the public sphere will require structural changes, 
but on an ideological and political level, it requires the conscious articulation of a 
discourse of active citizenship.  
 
In this regard, the theories of Habermas once again prove relevant. Far from 
ignoring the existence of ‘subaltern counter-publics’, Habermas has long practised a 
theoretical engagement with the question of social movements and their potential. The 
Theory of Communicative Action, published in Germany in 1981, is in many ways a 
continuation and development of the arguments contained in Structural Transformation. 
In theorising about the extent to which the increasingly technocratic, corporatized, and 
mediated forms of social organisation denote the ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’, he 
affirms the potential for change and democratic empowerment as embodied by popular 
protest movements that exist outside institutionalised forms.268 He writes: 
In the past decade or two, conflicts have developed in advanced Western 
countries that deviate in various ways from the welfare-state pattern of 
institutionalised conflict over distribution. They no longer flare up in domains of 
material reproduction; they are no longer channelled through parties and 
associations; and they can no longer be allayed by compensations. Rather, these 
new conflicts arise in domains of cultural reproduction, social integration, and 
socialisation; they are carried out in sub-institutional – or at least 
extraparliamentary – forms of protest; and the underlying deficits reflect a 
reification of communicatively structured domains of action that will not 
respond to the media of money and power.269 
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Habermas is explicitly referring here to the development of the women’s movement, the 
peace and anti-nuclear movement, the environmental movement, and the protests of 
social minorities.270 However, his analysis remains relevant given the contemporary 
mobilisation of a large, trans-global, and decentred anti-corporate movement. In her 
article ‘Habermas and Social Movements: What’s “New”?’, Gemma Edwards asserts 
that the Habermasian trope of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ is applicable to the 
intensifying process of capitalist corporatisation, the results of which can be witnessed 
in everything from the increasing omnipotence of advertising and branding in public 
spaces to the commercialisation of university campuses.271 However, she also argues 
that Habermas’s theories on protest movements and resistance to ‘colonisation’ have to 
be re-configured to address the fact that the differentiation between ‘old’ social 
movements based around ‘material reproduction’ and ‘new’ ones based on ‘cultural 
reproduction’ no longer apply.272 While the distinction perhaps made sense in the 
context of the Federal Republic of Germany during the early 1980s, where trade unions 
by and large formed part of the institutionalised apparatus of the welfare state, issues of 
unionism, wages, and conditions can no longer be separated from an analysis of social 
movements and counter-publics that are configured around the defence of the lifeworld. 
 
 Edwards is not therefore arguing that Habermas’s theory of social movements is 
now irrelevant but that it has to be revised to address the increasing convergence 
between the supposedly ‘old’ movement of trade unionism and the ‘new’ movements of 
anti-corporate protest. She cites the development of ‘community unions’, ‘living wage’ 
campaigns, and the event of the 2002/2003 British Fire-fighters’ strike.273 According to 
Edwards, that dispute should be understood not just as a campaign for wage increases 
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but also as a campaign against a proposed program of ‘modernisation’ involving cost-
cutting, more managerial control, and less flexibility in regard to working conditions.274 
Therefore, she argues, within the terms of Habermas’s theory, the industrial action 
embodied a resistance to increasing economic and administrative rationalism resulting 
in a ‘colonisation of the workplace’.275 In writing about the nature of ‘new’ protest 
movements and ‘alternative’ lifestyles, Habermas asserts that such practices are a direct 
challenge to ever more dominant and invasive forms of social and economic 
organisation. He states: 
Alternative practice is directed against the profit-dependent instrumentalization 
of work in one’s vocation, the market-dependent mobilisation of labor power, 
against the extension of pressures of competition and performance all the way 
down into elementary school. It also takes aim at the monetarization of services, 
relationships, and time, at the consumerist redefinition of private spheres of life 
and personal life-styles.276 
 
Over thirty years after this was first written, Habermas’s theoretical insights once more 
prove decidedly prescient when considering contemporary debates about the nature of 
work and leisure in a deregulated market economy. For Habermas, counter-publics are 
not formed through sitting at home in front of the television set. They are formed 
through actions of direct participatory engagement in the public sphere. The ‘Occupy’ 
movement and many of the events associated with the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ are 
examples of this. By these actions, colonisation is resisted and the public sphere is 
democratically reclaimed. 
 
The example of the anti-corporate (or ‘Occupy’) movement and its global 
presence is conducive to the idea of what Morley terms ‘transnational public 
spheres’.277 This raises the question of whether conceptions of democracy and 
citizenship can effectively transcend the structural and ideological formations of the 
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nation-state. Morley asserts the need to ‘abandon the Habermasian assumption that the 
public sphere is necessarily (or intrinsically) national in scope and address the existence 
of cross-cutting transnational and diasporic public spheres’.278 However, Habermas does 
not make that assumption, and has long engaged with the intricacies of the relationship 
between democracy, citizenship, and nationalism. Like Morley, Habermas frames 
Europe as the site for discussing the limits and possibilities of a formalised trans- or 
post-national public sphere. In this, he follows the example of Kant.279 
 
The question of whether an increasingly politically integrated Europe 
demonstrates the potential for a post-national formation of citizenship thus concerns 
both theorists. Writing about the process of European integration, Morley states: 
If we are unable to transcend a notion of Europe as anything other than a nation-
state writ large, the project of creating a European AudioVisual Sphere of 
Culture risks simply replicating, on a larger scale, all the corresponding 
problems of nationalism. As Robbins notes, the discourse of EuroCulture 
emphasises cohesion, integration, union and security – values equally central to 
the kind of belonging associated with the problematic history of the nation-
state.280 
 
Therefore, a discourse of cultural metanationalism means that even transnational 
political formations do not preclude the exclusion of certain people from belonging. 
Habermas, viewing such concerns from the perspective of German history, has long 
argued that, within the context of a democratic state, belonging should be politically 
articulated not through a discourse of cultural nationalism, but instead by means of a 
‘constitutional patriotism’.281 He argues that such a discourse locates citizenship within 
a negotiated framework of mutual rights and responsibilities and thus separates it from 
the tropes of shared ethnicity or culture.282 He positions such a concept as the basis for 
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any just and effective post-national political and social formations.283 Thus, citizenship 
is framed as a political and ethical value of participation and solidarity rather than as a 
legal category of limited belonging. 
 
 Both Morley and Habermas are engaged with the question of how to separate the 
concepts of nation and culture from the discourse and practice of democratic 
citizenship. While Morley grounds the discussion of the realisation of an egalitarian 
multicultural society within the discourse of post-structuralist theory, Habermas 
approaches the project from a historical and materialist perspective that stresses the 
importance of legal and social frameworks. Both theorists measure the possibilities and 
shortcomings of an inclusive conception of citizenship against the situations 
experienced by those most on the margins of national belonging: immigrants, refugees, 
and those whose ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ difference is marked in relation to the dominant 
social group. These groups challenge the essentialist conflation of political organisation 
and territoriality with the supposed imperatives of shared culture and shared ethnicity. 
Such a conception of citizenship, which Morley terms ‘cultural fundamentalism’, 
remains the dominant discourse through which the nation state and its attendant political 
relations are theorised.284 In addressing the issue of how a more integrated Europe 
avoids the pitfalls of a metanational(ist) structure, Morley states that the ‘question of 
who is to be allowed in or out through the doors of Europe is a crucial one, most 
particularly at a moment when its walls themselves are being rebuilt’.285 Habermas 
addresses that question with regard to expanding the political and legal conception of 
citizenship. 
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 In 1990, during the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin wall and the 
process of Eastern Bloc dissolution and German reunification, Habermas wrote an essay 
entitled ‘Citizenship and National Identity’ in which he focused consideration of the 
historical formation of the nation-state and the prospects for greater European 
integration around the question of greater democratic inclusiveness, with reference to 
contemporary debates over multiculturalism and immigration. Pivotal to this historical 
understanding of how conceptions of the nation state have evolved is an analysis of the 
links between the development of the nation as a political entity and liberal democracy 
as the normative or idealised model of political organisation. 
 
Habermas draws a distinction between ‘prepolitical’ and ‘political’ conceptions 
of nationhood. He writes that the use of the term ‘nation’ to denote commonality in a 
society based on the attributes of supposedly shared descent, culture and language dates 
from the classical period and was familiar to European thought by the Middle Ages, 
although he asserts that the political conception of a nation as a sovereign state had 
already developed by the ‘early-modern period’.286 He argues that while these two 
differing conceptions of nationhood have been interlinked since the eighteenth century, 
the emerging discourse of democracy and liberal republicanism enabled citizenship as a 
value system and a signifier of political belonging to be separated from the trope of 
ethno-cultural homogeneity. Writing on the legacy of the French Revolution, Habermas 
states: 
The nation of citizens finds its identity not in ethnic and cultural commonalities 
but in the practice of citizens who actively exercise their rights to participation 
and communication. At this juncture, the republican strand of citizenship 
completely parts company with the idea of belonging to a prepolitical 
community integrated on the basis of descent, shared tradition, and common 
language. Viewed from this end, the initial fusion of national conscious with 
republican conviction only functioned as a catalyst.287 
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He goes on to state categorically that ‘citizenship was never conceptually tied to 
national identity’.288 Thus, peoples’ rights as citizens are not tethered to, and transcend, 
the need to belong to a nation as a cultural entity. Extrapolating from this, Habermas 
addresses the question of how the recognition of citizenship as both an ethical value and 
a legal entitlement can transcend its mobilisation as a category predicated on territorial 
exclusivity. 
 
 Habermas frames the question of whether a transnational mode of citizenship 
can operate in an integrated Europe as being a matter of the extent to which the 
mechanisms of democracy can keep pace and exist with the process of greater economic 
and bureaucratic integration.289 Like Morley, Habermas argues that the conventional 
idea of the nation-state cannot simply be transposed onto an integrated Europe without 
replicating the problems of nationalism. He employs his conception of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’ to assert how a united Europe will require a discourse of expressly political 
citizenship, involving the development of transnational public spheres, operating 
separately from formations of culture.290 Dismissing essentialist conceptions of cultural 
exceptionism as the model for a common pan-European identity, he states that the idea 
of ‘common origins in the European Middle Ages’ is irrelevant to the development of 
pan-European citizenship.291 The question of to what extent tropes of nationality, 
culture, and identity can be separated from the mechanisms of a nascent transnational 
citizenship is brought into focus by questions of immigration and marked cultural 
difference. 
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Habermas asserts that any conception of transnational citizenship leaves no 
justification for ‘restrictive or obstructionist asylum and immigration policies’.292 He 
argues that the legal value of citizenship must be affirmed in relation to universalist 
conceptions of human rights and democratic participation as opposed to national 
belonging. Following on from this, he cites approvingly historical and legal precedents 
for conferring citizenship rights upon immigrants as a matter of course, the principle 
being that anyone under the jurisdiction of a legal-political system must have the ability 
to participate in it.293 Such a universalist discourse on the nature of political rights and 
responsibilities forms the crux of his arguments concerning citizenship, and thus serves 
to qualify his affirmation of a multicultural and pluralist society. Referring to the moral 
responsibility of European states to maintain open boarders, he writes: 
They [European states] must not circle their wagons and use a chauvinism of 
affluence as cover against the onrush of immigrants and asylum seekers. 
Certainly the democratic right to self-determination includes the right to 
preserve one’s own political culture, which forms a concrete context for rights 
of citizenship, but it does not include the right to self-assertion of a privileged 
cultural form of life. Within the constitutional framework of the democratic rule 
of law, diverse forms of life can coexist equally. These must, however, overlap 
in a common political culture that in turn is open to impulses from new forms of 
life.294 
 
Therefore, the other side of Habermas’s insistence that the discourse of democratic 
citizenship be separated from the discourse of cultural essentialism is that he positions 
culture as being subordinate to political and legal frameworks. While, like Morley, he 
argues for the development of structures in which cultural difference and diversity can 
be supported within the context of an egalitarian society, he positions an acceptance of 
the dominant systems (such as the rule of law and the procedures of liberal democracy) 
through which the structural power of the state is organised as the framework upon 
which to do this. He positions the constitutional nation-state as a necessary component 
in moving towards a transnational democratic global order. 
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It is this affirmation of an arguably normative discourse of liberalism that has 
led some theorists writing from the perspective of cultural studies, such as Morley, to 
characterise Habermas as being an elitist exponent of the Eurocentric and legalistic 
values of the ‘Enlightenment project’. However, if a project of developing a socially 
just and inclusive model of citizenship that can accommodate multicultural and trans- or 
post-national social formations is to be realised, then there has to be some basis for 
common democratic participation and civic equality and solidarity. Implementing a 
model of constitutional patriotism does not entail that citizens swear unbending 
allegiance to a statically maintained political order but rather that, within the context of 
a multicultural and pluralist society, there is a discourse of mutual respect and 
validation underpinned by a system of equal rights and responsibilities to which 
everyone has recourse. While such a model does not of itself address the problem of 
structural inequalities, it does serve as the basis for a mode of democratic citizenship 
that can transcend the regressive nature of cultural essentialisms and fundamentalisms. 
 
Religion, Reason and the Constitutional State 
Habermas is committed to the promise of the Enlightenment. He opposes religious and 
cultural fundamentalism. He affirms the need for an inclusive and active public sphere. 
Taken together, what do these principles mean for how religion, particularly as a marker 
of cultural difference, should manifest itself in the constitutional state? Habermas has 
long written on questions relating to the practice of religious belief, in relation to both 
philosophy and social theory. Two different strands influence his stance towards 
questions of religion: the work of Kant and, more indirectly, a European-Jewish 
intellectual tradition that is the inheritance of the Frankfurt School. Habermas has long 
been a defender of the importance of this tradition to the development of European and 
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German philosophy.295 Recognition of this led him to be invited to a conference on 
Derrida’s theory in relation to the latter’s Jewish background. Derrida was present at 
Habermas’s resulting lecture, ‘How to Answer the Ethical Question: Derrida and 
Religion’.296 Habermas is acutely aware of how religious traditions can be used to frame 
questions of belonging and social justice. 
 
 The increasing recognition of Habermas’s respectful engagement with questions 
of religion and its role within the public sphere and the constitutional state resulted in a 
dialogue being organised between him and (then) Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in 2004. 
The agreed subject of the dialogue was ‘The Pre-political Moral Foundations of a Free 
State’.297 Both men delivered prepared responses that were later published together as 
The Dialectics of Secularization. While Ratzinger’s response was understandably to 
assert that such ‘pre-political moral foundations’ were derived from the truth of the 
Divine, Habermas used the opportunity to re-affirm his argument for mutual respect and 
tolerance within the framework of a secular polity. He argues that for a respectful 
dialogue to occur, secularists must acknowledge that ‘religious convictions have an 
epistemological status that is not purely and simply irrational’.298 He goes on to make 
the following assertion. 
The neutrality of the state authority on questions of world views guarantees the 
same ethical freedom to every citizen. This is incompatible with the political 
universalization of a secularist world view. When secularized citizens act in 
their role as citizens of the state, they must not deny in principle that religious 
images of the world have the potential to express truth. Nor must they refuse 
their believing follow citizens the right to make contributions in a religious 
language to public debates. Indeed, a liberal political culture can expect that the 
secularized citizens play their part in the endeavors to translate relevant 
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contributions from the religious language into a language that is accessible to the 
public as a whole.299 
 
Habermas condemns both religious and atheist fundamentalisms. As noted above, 
Habermas positions multicultural and cosmopolitan pluralism as being enabled by legal 
equality within the framework of a liberal and constitutional state. He affirms 
multiculturalism but rejects overly relativist and romanticised conceptions of what it 
should be. Religious and cultural pluralism must not displace civil equality and the rule 
of law but function within it. Tracing the connection between the historical development 
of religious tolerance and the practice of multicultural policy, he states: 
The advance in reflexivity exacted from religious consciousness in pluralistic 
societies in turn provides a model for the mindset of secular groups in 
multicultural societies. For multiculturalism that understands itself in the right 
way is not a one-way street to the cultural self-assertion of groups with their 
own collective identities. The equal coexistence of different forms of life must 
not lead to segmentation. It calls for the integration of all citizens and the mutual 
recognition of their subcultural memberships within the framework of a shared 
political culture.… The same constitutional basic norms in terms of which 
cultural exemptions and authorizations are justified also define their limits.300 
 
The collective rights claimed by a religious or cultural group must be balanced against 
the rights of the individual and the legal and ethical norms of a constitutional and 
democratic polity. In this regard, Habermas positions traditional liberalism as being a 
better foundation for multicultural policy than what he terms ‘postmodern 
liberalism’.301 He is aware that an emphasis on the collective rights of a cultural or 
religious group, irrespective of what individuals deemed to belong to that group may 
want or think, has ‘the potential to promote internal repression’.302 A collectivist 
conception of multiculturalism, coupled with cultural essentialism and moral relativism, 
can be harmful to the rights of individuals and the expression of difference not just 
between but also within cultural groupings. 
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 Habermas positions his views on religion, and the role of religious belief within 
the state, as being influenced by the work of Kant.303 He sees in Kant’s philosophy of 
religion a way to criticise dogma and fundamentalism while making positive use of the 
moral and intellectual resources of a faith that has been filtered through reason.304 
However, the view of religion and the state that Habermas expounds may actually be 
closer to Mendelssohn than to Kant. In Chapter Three, I explained Mendelssohn’s 
arguments concerning religion and the state as expounded in Jerusalem. I demonstrated 
both the similarities and the differences with Kant’s view as put forward in Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Both men argued for religious toleration by the 
state and the importance of a rational conception of religion for a moral society. 
However, I noted the argument of Hunter that Kant may have been advocating the re-
establishment of a certain interpretation of German Protestantism as a confessional state 
religion. Habermas’s conception of religious freedom and equality as being enabled by 
a state that is genuinely secular and neutral mirrors that of Mendelssohn. The influence 
of Kantian thought on Habermas is well recognised but what of Mendelssohn? Given 
Habermas’s recognition of the importance of the Jewish intellectual tradition to German 
philosophy, his silence on Mendelssohn is intriguing. 
 
 The ideas put forward by Mendelssohn remain relevant to the theorisation of 
multiculturalism, secularism and an inclusive public sphere. As shown in Chapter 
Three, Jerusalem argues not just for ‘toleration’ of religious and cultural difference but 
primarily for a system of both individual and collective rights and freedoms within the 
framework of a secular state. While defending its virtues, Mendelssohn does not seek to 
establish Judaism as a state religion nor does he grant it a monopoly on metaphysical 
truth. He argues for freedom of belief not just in relation to the state but also in relation 
                                                
303 ibid., p. 211. 
304 ibid. 
 115 
to cultural groups. In opposing the practice of herem, the Judaic equivalent of 
excommunication, he is refuting ‘internal oppression’. Within the context of its time, 
Jerusalem stands as a genuinely ‘enlightened’ document in every sense of the word. 
 
 In discussing the current relevance of Mendelssohn’s ideas, the criticism can be 
made that the arguments advanced in Jerusalem do not go beyond conventionally 
liberal conceptions of multiculturalism, secularism and pluralism. The criticism can also 
be made that while Mendelssohn advocates freedom of religion, he does not allow for 
freedom from religion, making no concessions to those who identify as agnostic or 
atheist. Such criticisms point to a line of argument that Mendelssohn’s ideas, while 
progressive for their time, have nothing new to offer in terms of contemporary social or 
cultural theory. However, if Habermas can argue for the continuing relevance of Kant 
then a similar appeal can be made in relation to Mendelssohn. As we have seen, 
Mendelssohn positions religion as being central to the moral basis of society and yet he 
argues against coercion of the individual on matters of religious belief, whether it is 
from the state, religious institutions or cultural groups. An individual should not have 
religious truth imposed on them, nor be subject to interrogation concerning what they 
actually believe, because such matters are the sole prerogative of the Divine. 
Mendelssohn’s arguments are antithetical to any current manifestation of religious 
fundamentalism. His belief in concepts of natural law and human rationality, as 
explained in Chapter Three, means that his ideal of human morality can be transposed 
on to a system of secular ethics. Mendelssohn’s system of ethics may be more 
genuinely secular than that of Kant. When discussing questions of religious and cultural 
pluralism within the context of a secular and constitutional state, the work of 
Mendelssohn is still deserving of attention. 
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Feminist Interventions in the Public Sphere 
There is an increasing recognition within the broad field of cultural theory of the 
liberating potential of the ideas put forward by protagonists of the Enlightenment. Such 
recognition extends to feminist theory. For example, in referring to Wollstonecraft and 
her contemporaries, Kate Soper concisely notes that ‘when considering which, if any, 
aspects of the “feminism” of the eighteenth century Enlightenment one might wish to 
see resuscitated, one might be inclined to argue that it would be its republican vein’.305 
Rather than rejecting outright the classically republican conception of the public sphere, 
feminist advocates of an inclusive polity can recognise its usefulness, while seeking to 
modify it. In considering the relevance of the ideas of Wollstonecraft and de Gouges to 
contemporary feminist theorisation of the public sphere, attention shall initially be 
turned to the work of Nancy Fraser. 
 
 Although Fraser has been critical of Habermas’s theorisation of the public 
sphere, she does not reject it entirely but instead seeks to develop it. While Habermas’s 
concept of ‘deliberative democracy’ is a synthesis of the classically liberal and the 
classically republican conception of democracy, Fraser attempts to synthesise (neo) 
Marxist and post-structuralist theoretical models in writing on matters of social justice. 
The long-standing goal of her theoretical project has been to combine ‘the politics of 
redistribution’, by which she means economic justice and socialism, with the ‘politics of 
recognition’, by which she means the identity politics of the contemporary cultural 
left.306 Fraser explicitly rejects an ‘either/or’ choice between the two, or arguments that 
one strand is more important than the other to the advancement of social justice.307 Both 
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strands are of equal importance in her theorisation of a genuinely inclusive public 
sphere. 
 
 Fraser has long argued that the critical and emancipatory potential of 
Habermas’s work is compromised by his inadequate recognition of gender. Such 
criticism extends to his attempts from the 1970s onwards to address the issue. She 
objects to his cursory recognition of feminism as a ‘new social movement’ in The 
Theory of Communicative Action. This objection is linked to her broader concerns about 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the ‘system/lifeworld’ theoretical distinction to 
account for gendered differences in social practice.308 Nonetheless, Fraser does not seek 
to jettison Habermas’s basic theoretical model but to ‘reconstruct’ it so that it better 
addresses the integral question of gender.309 She refers to Habermas’s work as 
constituting an ‘indispensible resource’ in its theorisation of the public sphere.310 For 
Fraser, the concept of an inclusive public sphere that does not exclude or devalue 
women is of fundamental importance to feminist theory. 
 
 What then, is the continued relevance of the work of Wollstonecraft and de 
Gouges to contemporary feminist theory and practice? If, as Soper contends, the 
‘republican’ ideal might be the legacy of the Enlightenment that feminists can use, then 
the ways in which both Wollstonecraft and de Gouges attempt to re-frame the idea of 
feminine ‘virtue’ remains important. As we have seen, both women grappled with 
trying to ‘de-gender’ the concept of active citizenship in the public sphere. This struggle 
was manifested both in their writings and how they lived their lives. Contrary to some 
interpretations, their work does not merely take ‘male’ norms as human norms. Nor, in 
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seeking to valorise active female citizenship in the public sphere, do they devalue 
women who perform ‘traditional’ roles in the private sphere (with the exception of 
Wollstonecraft’s ideological critique of aristocratic ‘women of leisure’). In attempting 
to replace the ideal of female sexual virtue with republican civic virtue, the effect is 
two-fold. A model of equal citizenship for both men and women is promulgated while 
the concept of female ‘virtue’ acquires a different meaning and no longer pertains to 
sexual control. The work of Wollstonecraft and de Gouges goes beyond proto-
liberalism and remains relevant to contemporary feminism in its envisioning of active 
and egalitarian citizenship. 
 
The development of a genuinely democratic and inclusive public sphere is 
positioned within cultural studies as central for the realisation of social justice and 
progressive change. An ‘enlightened’ mode of modernity will not hinder such a project 
but assist it. Concepts such as political liberalism, the rule of law and the constitutional 
state should be subject to continual scrutiny and reform but should not be rejected. 
Habermas’s conception of the public sphere and deliberative democracy is not the final 
word on the subject but a framework on which others can build. Likewise, in arguing 
for the continued relevance of Mendelssohn to the theorisation of multiculturalism and 
Wollstonecraft and de Gouges to feminist theory, I am not attempting to impose any 
prescriptive models. Rather, I have endeavoured to demonstrate how certain ideas 
stemming from the historical Enlightenment may be of continuing relevance to the 
theorisation of social justice within the broad field of cultural studies. 
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Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has focused on a re-positioning of the historical Enlightenment and its 
legacy within cultural theory, and in particular within the field of cultural studies. It has 
consisted of three parts sub-divided into five chapters. Part One (Chapter One and 
Chapter Two) is concerned with the theoretical positioning of the historical 
Enlightenment. Chapter One is focused on the dominant representation of 
‘Enlightenment’ within cultural studies and how this is problematic. Chapter Two is 
centred on Habermas’s affirmation of ‘Enlightenment’ and his rapprochement with 
Derrida and Foucault on this point. Part Two (Chapters Three and Four) demonstrates 
how contemporary figures within the historical Enlightenment sought to use its 
principles and practices to advance social change and challenge the marginal status of 
the social groups to which they belonged. Chapter Three is centred on the figure of 
Moses Mendelssohn and Chapter Four is centred on Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe 
de Gouges. Part Three (Chapter Five) is concerned with the continued relevance of 
Enlightenment thought to the theorisation of progressive social change and an inclusive 
public sphere. 
 
Insofar as it remains the ‘unfinished project’, the Enlightenment, in all its 
manifestations, embodies a dynamic and self-critical model of progressive modernity. 
In this sense, cultural studies can be viewed as its ‘child’. Such a model of progressive 
modernity is necessary to the theorisation of just social change. Practitioners within the 
broad field of cultural theory, including cultural studies, can benefit from recognising 
and understanding this as the relevant legacy of a historical Enlightenment that is 
manifold and complex. Within this dissertation, I have attempted to chart both this 
complexity and the question of legacy. There is the question, related to historiography, 
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of how the Enlightenment is positioned and then there is the question, related to history, 
of what the Enlightenment actually was. The first question was addressed in Part One of 
this dissertation and the second question was addressed in Part Two. Linking the two 
questions, in Chapter Two I demonstrated how the predominant view of ‘the 
Enlightenment’ held within the ‘Anglo sphere’ of cultural studies is, to some extent, 
based on a misreading or misunderstanding of cultural theorists including Foucault and 
Derrida, who both held an ultimately affirmative view of ‘Enlightenment’. In Chapter 
Five, I sought to demonstrate the continuing relevance of an Enlightenment model of 
modernity to the theorisation of a genuinely inclusive and democratic public sphere. In 
so doing, I returned to the example of Habermas as well as the protagonists of the 
historical Enlightenment who featured in Part Two. 
 
In this dissertation, Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges serve to 
exemplify the progressive and self-critical impulse within the historical Enlightenment. 
While they were chosen as the most salient examples, there are other figures that could 
have been foregrounded. In Chapter Four, references were made to other women writers 
including Catherine Macaulay and Germaine de Staël. In relation to Mendelssohn and 
issues of racial ‘otherness’, there is the figure of Olaudah Equiano, an African former 
slave who settled in England and was involved in the abolitionist movement in the 
1790s.311 However, his close association with the expressly anti-Enlightenment figures 
of William Wilberforce and Hannah Moore made his inclusion problematic. 
Nonetheless, there are many protagonists within the historical Enlightenment who 
deserve further scholarly attention. 
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To the extent to which I have demonstrated that there is a gulf between the 
predominant view within cultural studies of the Enlightenment as an embodiment of 
oppressive modernity and its progressive actuality, the question now is how such a re-
positioned Enlightenment can be used as a resource within cultural studies. Chapter 
Five went some way towards answering that question. However, a more affirmative 
view of the legacy of the Enlightenment within cultural studies can go beyond, for 
example,  simply agreeing with Habermas or granting cursory acknowledgement to 
Wollstonecraft as a ‘proto-feminist’ figure. It can entail the recognition that enlightened 
praxis remains relevant to the realisation of progressive change. 
 
 Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges are theorists writing from the 
‘subaltern’ position about the need for justice and progressive change. The ‘subaltern’, 
pace Spivak, does speak within the enlightened public sphere.312 These three figures all 
positioned themselves at the centre of the ‘republic of letters’, although not without 
consequence. They were marginalised people who refused to marginalise themselves. 
They can serve as an example to those who speak as the marginalised. They could see 
the disconnection between Enlightenment discourses of ‘reason’ and ‘the rights of man’ 
and their own respective situations. However, they did not reject the Enlightenment as 
being irredeemably oppressive but instead sought to improve its emancipatory potential 
through processes of constructive critique. The question that each of them essentially 
asked can be framed as ‘how can the principles and practices of the Enlightenment be 
used to open up the public sphere to people like me?’ which they then endeavoured to 
answer. While the emancipatory projects that they each initiated were not realised 
within their own respective lifetimes, and are not fully realised now, such a reality 
underscores the argument that the Enlightenment embodies an ‘unfinished project’. 
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 The rhetorical question that I devised above, ‘how can the principles and 
practices of the Enlightenment be used to open up the public sphere to people like me?’ 
is one that can be asked by those working in cultural studies who, like Mendelssohn or 
Wollstonecraft or de Gouges, have identities which can be considered to be currently 
disempowered and marginalised. Such a question is linked to the one asked by Foucault 
and cited in the first chapter, ‘what is this Reason that we use?’ and goes to the issue, 
identified by Habermas, of how ‘enlightenment’ can be criticised or rendered 
problematic while still being ultimately affirmed. The ‘disempowered groups’ hailed by 
cultural studies, including the female, the ethnically ‘other’, the queer, the disabled and 
the economically disadvantaged, can ask this opening question, just as Mendelssohn, 
Wollstonecraft and de Gouges did in their own time. 
 
 There exist strong parallels between the profile of the activist cultural studies 
intellectual during its development and the profile of the activist intellectual of the 
historical Enlightenment. As detailed in Chapter One, cultural studies in Britain did not 
emerge from Oxford or Cambridge but from more marginal academic centres such as 
Birmingham. Its protagonists, including Hoggart, Williams and Hall, were not Oxford 
dons who taught Classical Greek. Its students and graduate practitioners included 
people from the working class, women and black immigrants such as Hall and Gilroy. 
They were people attempting to theorise their own experiences with a goal of realising 
progressive social change. This summation is of course cultural studies’ narrative of 
itself.313 However, it also mirrors the narrative of the role of public or organic 
intellectuals within the historical Enlightenment. In Britain, ‘enlightened’ thought and 
thinkers did not come through the conservative milieu of Oxford, with the notable 
exception of Isaac Newton. Locke was excluded from Oxford, and his work was not 
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taught there throughout the eighteenth century.314 To the extent that ‘Enlightened’ 
thought was included in University syllabuses in Britain, it was in Scotland. It was 
Edinburgh and Glasgow, not Oxford and Cambridge, which were the academic centres 
of Enlightenment in Britain.315 However, both in Britain and throughout Europe, the 
development of both ideas and intellectuals occurred largely outside of the established 
universities, which were often inherently conservative. 
 
This is partly why theorisations of the ‘public sphere’ are central in histories of 
the Enlightenment. The ‘republic of letters’ encompassed alternative intellectual hubs 
including salons, new academies and circles of publishers and writers. Such a statement 
fits within conventional historical narratives of the Enlightenment. However, it also 
points to how, within the Enlightened public sphere, openings were created for new 
kinds of people to emerge as intellectuals. Mendelssohn did not go to university. 
Wollstonecraft and de Gouges could not go. Intellectual development in the 
Enlightenment ran counter to established thought and institutions.  
 
It is to be hoped that this attempt to draw parallels between the Enlightenment 
and the development of cultural studies is not overly forced. Nonetheless, if the legacy 
of the historical Enlightenment is to be re-positioned within cultural studies, then there 
has to be recognition of the extent to which enlightened thinkers could come from 
disempowered or marginalised backgrounds and present a progressive challenge to 
established power. The figure of the radical and organic activist intellectual within the 
historical Enlightenment is embodied by de Gouges. She was self-taught and 
transmitted her political and social views through the popular public sphere. As shown 
in Chapter Four, this included pamphlets but also posters and plays. Even before the 
                                                
314 Porter, Enlightenment: Britain and the Creation of the Modern World, pp. 29 & 68. 
315 ibid., p. 246. 
 124 
revolution of 1789, de Gouges was devising political theatre. Polemics against slavery 
or for improvements in the status of women were devised as plays intended for a mass 
audience. She was using contemporary popular or mass culture as a site of argument 
and contestation, intending to communicate enlightened and radical ideas to ‘ordinary’ 
people. After the Revolution, in both her plays and her other writings, she was 
attempting to steer the course of political and social development in a direction that was 
genuinely democratic, pluralistic and humane. 
 
The commitment to democratic praxis entailed continuing to communicate 
directly with a mass readership or audience within the expanded public sphere of post-
revolutionary France. As noted in Chapter Four, de Gouges’s Declaration of the Rights 
of Woman and the Female Citizen was not an extended essay in book form, as was 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, but was instead based directly on the official Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.316 She was appropriating a widely circulated 
official public proclamation and re-writing it as a manifesto for equal female citizenship 
within the new order. While it would be trite and anachronistic to describe this as 
‘culture-jamming’, the salient point is that de Gouges’s strategic interventions represent 
an Enlightenment which is radical and conducted in the public sphere by people who 
are outside positions of power and privilege. 
 
 The dominant view of ‘the Enlightenment’ propagated by cultural studies, as 
outlined in Chapter One, is therefore not sustainable. The reductionist idea that there 
was or is a singular ‘Enlightenment’, that in the name of emancipation inscribes an 
overly rationalist and oppressive mode of modernity that perpetuates exclusion, cannot 
continue to be held against the evidence. In this dissertation at least three falsifying 
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cases, as embodied by Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges, have been 
adduced. Radically progressive critiques of the historical Enlightenment existed within 
the historical Enlightenment. Within cultural studies, there can be recognition that a 
feminist critique of Enlightenment thought begins not with the ‘second wave’ theory of 
the nineteen seventies, as crucially important as that is, but with the contemporary 
protagonists of the Enlightenment including Wollstonecraft and de Gouges. The ways in 
which both women strategically engaged with the public sphere can also be 
acknowledged in relation to feminist praxis. There can be recognition of the importance 
of Mendelssohn in the theorisation of cultural pluralism and the secular and 
constitutional state. As was stated in Chapter Five, I am not seeking to impose 
prescriptive models. However, continued misunderstanding of the Enlightenment within 
cultural studies is, to a considerable extent, robbing the field of a crucial resource. To 
criticise the Enlightenment while affirming it is itself a legacy of Enlightenment. 
 
 This dissertation has been concerned with a re-positioning of the historical 
Enlightenment and its legacy within cultural studies. Such a re-positioning has been 
achieved by contrasting the narrative of the Enlightenment that predominates within the 
field with the progressive action of some of its protagonists. The figures of 
Mendelssohn, Wollstonecraft and de Gouges serve not only as falsifying cases but also 
as examples of progressive (and transgressive) praxis. It has been demonstrated that the 
legacy of ‘Enlightenment’ is more emancipatory than it is oppressive. The question now 
for practitioners within the broad field of cultural studies is how such a re-positioned 
‘Enlightenment’ can be more widely recognised, and used in the theorisation of 
progressive social change. This dissertation has served as an intervention towards that 
end. 
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